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## A COMMENT ON VIETNAM

This magazine began publication in January, 1969. This is the editorial we never thought we would have to write, because this war was lost in 1954. The fact of its loss has been extraordinarily difficult for Americans to face— from Cardinal Spellman, the first villain of American involvement, to John Kennedy, trying to prove his manhood after the Bay of Pigs, to Lyndon Johnson, so pathetically striving to be the Churchill-Roosevelt of the 1960's.

Now Richard Nixon has dreams of a peace that will justify the lost American lives.

One can understand him—as one can understand all the American Presidents who have sent men to die in Vietnam—you can't tell their families they died for nothing.

But to save other men from dying, we have to admit that those who have died have not died for nothing, but to bring America to its senses.

It's time to get out, not with fantasies of victory, but with practical plans for the survival of our troops and of the South Vietnamese who have been led to rely on us—not with saving of face but with saving of life, for their people and for ours.

Charles Peters
Editor

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The Washington Monthly is a new magazine with a new purpose—to help you understand our system of politics and government, where it breaks down, why it breaks down, and what can be done to make it work.

The American system is in trouble. It's not responding well enough or fast enough to our critical national problems.

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# Letters

## Courage and Cowardice Continued

In answer to your invitation to write ["More on Courage and Cowardice," August, 1969], I believe:

1) Resignations smack a little of "tantrums" in not having one's own way. I think public officials should struggle on to the point of being "fired." If they turn out to be correct, forcing a superior to fire them would be more effective.

2) It's too early and Finch too valuable to the country for him to have to step aside. He should wait for a bigger issue or a series of issues.

J. CARTER FAHY
Center Ossipee, N.H.

In the balance sheet that you and many others have added up, it's necessary to add my impression that Clark Clifford would not have begun a reversal on Vietnam without people around him who had stayed even though they might like to have resigned, and who could take advantage of his coming in, to press arguments that had previously been repressed or frustrated. Their resignations would not be effective, because they were not luminous; they were not Cabinet or Subcabinet people. Furthermore, in the world in which they live, not that of the career civil servant, to stay in a corrupt, contaminated, venomous government may take more courage than to get out! There is such a vogue of purity now that it may cloud judgment as to which decision, in all the complex circumstances in which an individual finds himself, is the truly moral course.

DAVID RIESMAN
Cambridge

"The Cost of Cowardice: Silence in the Foreign Service," [July, 1969] is a very bad article, primarily because of the author's obvious lack of knowledge of his subject—the American Foreign Service. Flat factual errors—such as stating that desk officers have clearance authority over Bureau of Intelligence and Research reports—are serious enough, but what is really wrong is the evident ignorance of the author of (a) the theory and realities of a professional civil service, (b) the theory and realities of a professional diplomatic service, (c) the American Foreign Service and in particular the people in it, (d) the theory, history, and practice of diplomacy, and finally and most damning (e) the legion of journalists, academics, diplomats, politicians, and just plain folks who wrote about the Foreign Service long before Mr. Bell obviously thought he had discovered it.

Even if I felt so inclined to make a point by point refutation of Mr. Bell's article, it would be difficult to do so as it is largely composed of selected (to make his point) Service cocktail-party and coffee-break gossip. I hardly think such unsubstantiated reporting proves much of anything, as no one has ever seriously suggested that the Foreign Service was composed solely of paragons. Mr. Bell really should realize that the Service is an institution of human beings, and therefore flawed. In addition, an author should make some effort to be informed and accurate about his subject (e.g. where is that *small* consulate headed by a Foreign Service Officer whose staff includes an Air Force Officer aide?).

I realize that Mr. Bell, like most of the



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rest of us, has to make a living, and that uninformed and indiscriminate criticism of institutions like the Foreign Service is an undemanding activity for apprentice journalists, but, as a Foreign Service Officer I prefer my criticism—like my wine, food, friends, and ideas—to be of a relatively high quality.

EDWARD MARKS
Washington, D.C.

During my 26 years of diplomatic-military service and especially the last two assignments—as Deputy to Lodge in Saigon 1963-64 and as Minister and Chargé in Cairo 1965-67—I certainly found that the overwhelming force in the bureaucracy is to conform to the views of one's superiors and not to "rock the boat" with dissenting opinions ["The Cost of Cowardice: Silence in the Foreign Service," July, 1969].

As you know, 1964 was the critical year of decision in Vietnam—whether we would cut our losses and extricate ourselves or go all out with U.S. forces and strive for a military solution. Although every senior F.S.O. familiar with the problem agreed that the "counter-insurgency" effort which McNamara, Rusk, the Bundy and Rostow Brothers were relying on to assure our objective could and would not succeed, not one dared challenge their views or pose frankly and clearly the alternative options. My own assessment of the situation resulted in my removal from Saigon.

DAVID NES
Owings Mills, Maryland

## Fan Mail

I am not sure whether editors are accustomed to fan mail, but let me toss in a letter of appreciation for the excellent quality of your publication, *The Washington Monthly*.

I am particularly impressed with the August issue. This publication should be must reading for every man in public life. It's thoughtful, provocative, and, if you like politics, an exciting publication. Thanks for making it available to us, particularly at a time when there's so much nonsense published and more said.

HUBERT H. HUMPHREY
Washington

## Correction

Walter Goodman ("The Committee Revisited," July, 1969) wrote that I took my "demotion to 'director of research' hard, and resigned." Inasmuch as I did not resign, it could not have been for the reason stated.

Quibbling about minor points doesn't interest me, but I served as staff director of the committee for 6½ years, not 5 as Mr. Goodman reported. This is mentioned only to demonstrate that 3 of the 4 "facts" in the one sentence Mr. Goodman wrote about me are not true.

In view of the stated high purpose of your magazine, I trust that most of your contributors manage to do a little better than 25% on the matter of the accuracy of their reporting.

FRANCIS J. MCNAMARA
Bethesda, Maryland

## Diplomaism

I agree with nearly everything David Hapgood says ("Degrees: The Case For Abolition," August, 1969) and you have put into circulation a set of ideas which have to be dealt with by the educators.

There is a parallel line of argument which seems to me worth taking: take the credential society as it is, take the need for whole new sets of human skills, take the diplomas now distributed, since these are basic institutionalized arrangements which, as you say, are a son of a bitch to move. But you can do an enormous amount of rearranging inside the diploma-credit system, especially in the community colleges and some of the new movements in student-initiated courses and student experimental colleges. There is now a fairly strong student movement, part of it running in the National Student Association Center for Educational Reform, in the direction of using practical social experience, new student curricula, work-study programs, etc., for college credit. These reforms are happening not so much in the structure of the system (much of it

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is too deeply entrenched to get it changed in time for the present students) but in the content of the work for which course-credit is given toward the diploma.

HAROLD TAYLOR
Ashland, New Hampshire

*Mr. Taylor, a former president of Sarah Lawrence College, is the author of the recent book,* Students Without Teachers: The Crisis in the University.

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## The Regulatory Agencies

I began reading your article on the regulatory agencies, ["The Regulatory Agencies: What Should Be Done?" August, 1969] with great anticipation, being professionally concerned with activities of the Federal Power Commission.

I was disturbed, therefore, to discover a critical piece of misinformation in the fourth paragraph, where author Kohlmeier tells us that FPC, "if...not wholly to blame" for the Northeast blackout of November 1965, was at least partially to blame because of its "bad planning." FPC does not have authority to plan for utilities or even to order the construction or operation of critical transmission lines or generating stations. Anyone with even the most cursory understanding of the Federal Power Act or FPC's functions in administering it should know this.

Mr. Kohlmeier's statement is comparable to saying that the U.S. Supreme Court is to blame for all the *de facto* segregation which still exists in the country.

ROBERT O. MARRITZ
Denver

*Mr. Marritz is executive director of the Missouri Basin Systems Group.*

I agree with many of Mr. Kohlmeier's proposals for abrogating regulatory controls and giving greater play to market processes ["The Regulatory Agencies: What Should Be Done?" August, 1969]. I have made some similar suggestions myself ("Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation," *Stanford Law Review*, February, 1969). What I cannot accept, and indeed can barely fathom, is the process of reasoning by which Kohlmeier derives his specific proposals for deregulation from the general reflections on the "fourth branch" that occupy the first half of the article.

He is evidently troubled by the fact that the regulatory agencies do not fit neatly into one of the three branches of government—legislative, executive, and judicial—specifically discussed in the Constitution, with the result, he asserts in his concluding paragraph, that the agencies are not subject to "the discipline of constitutional doctrine." If the implication is that foolish economic legislation would not be enacted if it couldn't be handed over to independent regulatory agencies for implementation, it is incorrect. The farm subsidy program, among others, contradicts any such thesis.

I therefore consider Kohlmeier's emphasis on "restructuring" the government somewhat misplaced. I am troubled, too, by a certain patness in his approach, typified by his statement: "When competition is reaffirmed and antitrust law is refurbished, there will be no need of regulators." This implies that there are no natural monopolies on interstate services. Yet, it is likely to be many years before long-distance telephone service, to choose only one example, can be efficiently provided on a competitive basis. One may still prefer unregulated to regulated monopoly; but that is a different, and harder, point, which Kohlmeier avoids.

I should myself prefer to see a somewhat different approach taken to the problem of defining the appropriate scope of government regulation of business. It would begin by seeking to identify those markets or industries in which market processes cannot be depended upon to bring about a reasonably efficient use of resources. These will chiefly be markets where the conditions of cost and demand make monopoly inevitable or where enterprises fail to take account of the full costs that their activities impose on society (the problem of pollution, broadly defined). Many regulatory activities, at both the federal and state level, flunk this threshold test and should be phased out. One may object that efficiency is not the only goal of society, and that is true; but



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it is ordinarily possible, and more efficient, to meet the other goals by transfer payments—direct subsidies. That is, if we wish to cushion farmers from the income effects of fluctuations in the amount of crops produced, we can pay them directly; we don't have to effect our goal by the roundabout, inefficient, and, as it turns out, inequitable method of keeping prices high by restricting output.

Even in those areas where free market processes will not operate efficiently, because of the factors mentioned, it would be wrong to jump to the conclusion that the government should automatically intervene. The government often fails to rectify market imperfections by its interventions; in fact, it often makes them worse. And the reasons for this failure are inherent in the character of the regulatory process, just as the reasons for market failure are inherent in certain types of market structure. The heart of the problem is that the output of a regulatory agency is not sold in any market; it is not priced. This makes it extraordinarily difficult to evaluate the success of regulatory agencies, to establish a system of rewards and penalties that will encourage good performance and discourage bad, and, in short, to impose adequate social controls on regulators. Insulated from the discipline of competition and denied the incentive of profits, regulatory personnel are largely free to substitute personal goals for those of society. It is little wonder that the regulatory agencies have such a poor record of serving the public interest.

In the real world, the choice for public policy is always between imperfect arrangements. Even when the structure of a market is such that competition will not allocate resources efficiently, it is necessary to consider that administrative allocation will not be efficient either. That is not to say that regulation is never warranted, but only that a careful comparison of the actual operation of alternative private and public modes of allocation is necessary before making a judgment for regulation.

Using this framework of analysis, it should be possible to demarcate the proper scope of regulation more precisely than heretofore, and thereby verify or disprove Mr. Kohlmeier's sweeping, though quite possibly justified, condemnation of the federal regulatory agencies.

RICHARD A. POSNER
Chicago

*Mr. Posner is a professor at the University of Chicago Law School.*

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


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# JAMIE WHITTEN: The Permanent Secretary of Agriculture

by Nick Kotz



*Nick Kotz is a Washington correspondent for* The Des Moines Register.

*This article is excerpted from the forthcoming book* Let Them Eat Promises: The Politics of Hunger in America, *© 1969 by Nick Kotz, published by Prentice-Hall, Inc.*

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With the sensitive instincts of a successful career bureaucrat, Dr. George Irving scanned the list of states scheduled for the National Nutrition Survey which was to measure the extent of hunger in America. Halfway down the column his glance froze, and he quickly dialed Congressman Jamie Whitten, the man known in Washington as the "permanent secretary of agriculture."

"Mr. Chairman, they've got Mississippi on that malnutrition study list, and I thought you'd want to know about it," dutifully reported Irving, director of the Agriculture Department's Research Service.

For the better part of 18 years as chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Agriculture, dapper Jamie L. Whitten has held an iron hand over the Department of Agriculture's budget. The entire 107,000-man department is tuned in to the Mississippi legislator's every whim.

"George, we're not going to have another smear campaign against Mississippi, are we?"declared Whitten to his informant. "You boys should be thinking about a *national* survey—and do some studies in Watts and Hough and Harlem!"

Dr. Irving alerted the government's food aid network. "Mr. Whitten wants Mississippi taken off that list," he told Department of Agriculture food administrator Rodney Leonard.

Leonard, in turn, called Dr. George Silver, a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, who was responsible for the joint USDA-HEW malnutrition survey.

"Jamie Whitten's found out Mississippi is on the list and is raising hell. I think we'd better drop it," Leonard said.

Silver, recalling HEW Secretary Wilbur Cohen's order to "avoid unnecessary political friction" in choosing the sample states for the hunger survey, called Dr. Arnold Schaefer, the project chief.

"Mississippi's out—politics!" Silver said curtly.

Back at the Department of Agriculture, food administrator Leonard snapped at Jamie Whitten's informant, "You couldn't have killed the project any better if you had planned it!"

Thus, in August, 1967, the Johnson Administration's first meaningful attempt to ascertain the facts about hunger in Mississippi was stopped cold by an executive department's fear of one Congressman. This kind of bureaucratic-congressional maneuvering, exercised between the lines of the law, is little understood, seldom given public scrutiny, and far too infrequently challenged. In the quiet process of hidden power, a bureaucrat in the Agriculture Department reacts more quickly to a raised eyebrow from Jamie Whitten than to a direct order from the Secretary himself. Time after time, a few words from Jamie Whitten can harden into gospel at the Department of Agriculture. Indeed, a casual Whitten statement may be so magnified as it is whispered from official to official that the response is more subservient than even the Congressman had in mind.

The stocky, 59-year-old Congressman is not shy about his meteoric rise from a country store in Tallahatchie County to a key position in the nation's capital. And his record is impressive—trial lawyer and state legislator at 21, district attorney for five counties at 23, U.S. Congressman at 31 (in 1941), and chairman of an appropriations subcommittee at 36. His steely self-confidence, studied informality, and carefully conservative clothes suggest anything but the stereotype of country-lawyer-come-to-Washington. Only the beginning of a paunch detracts from a physical sense of strength and energy that radiates from Jamie Whitten.

For all his dynamic presence, Whitten has a way of confounding a listener—or potential critic—with silky



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southern rhetoric. It is a test of mental agility to remember the original course of a conversation, as one high USDA official noted: "When you check on things with him, Whitten can go all around the barn with you. Oftentimes you don't fully understand what he meant. So you latch onto the most obvious point you can find and act on that."

With his implicit power, Whitten doesn't *have* to threaten or be specific. In fact, as George Irving pointed out about his conversation with the Congressman that led to dropping Mississippi from the national hunger survey, "He wasn't saying 'don't go to Mississippi,' he was just suggesting that we think about other places."

Bureaucratic officials who are familiar with Whitten's oblique way of expressing his ideas know also that the Mississippian can rattle off complicated economic statistics and arguments with precise logic and organized thought.

Whitten legally holds the power of the purse, and he exercises it shrewdly. His appropriations subcommittee doles out funds for every item in the Agriculture Department's $7 billion budget, and it does not take long for Washington bureaucrats to realize that the chairman's wrath can destroy precious projects and throw hundreds of people out of jobs.

"He's got the most phenomenal information and total recall," one Agriculture official says of Whitten. "Once you fully understand his do's and don'ts and establish rapport with him, life is a whole lot easier!"

Jamie Whitten's considerable power is enhanced by his scholarship. He is a conscientious student of every line of the Agriculture budget, and his hawk's-eye is legendary among department officials. They, in turn, anticipate his scrutiny by checking planned moves with him, thus extending to him a virtual veto on the most minute details. "A suggestion, that's all you have to have in this business," admitted Rodney Leonard.

The key to this phenomenal power—which goes beyond that of budget control—lies in Whitten's network of informants within the Department, and his skill in directing their activities and operations. Executive branch officials learn to protect their own jobs, adjusting their loyalties to the legislative branch in a way the founding fathers may not have envisioned when they devised their splendid system of checks and balances. Bureaucratic allies of a particular Congressman may be able to inject that Congressman's political views (or their own) into laws or programs sponsored by the Administration without the consent, or even the knowledge, of the department head. Secretaries of Agriculture come and go, but Jamie Whitten remains, a product of Mississippi's political oligarchy and the seniority system in Congress.

In theory, an appropriations subcommittee only considers requests for funds to finance programs already approved by Congress. Thus Whitten shares some power with Bob Poage of Texas, chairman of the House Agriculture Committee. In actuality, a skillful chairman such as Whitten can control policy, alter the original authorizing legislation, and wind up virtually controlling the administration of a department.

In addition to Chairman Whitten, the Agriculture Appropriations Subcommittee has seven members: Democrats William H. Natcher of Kentucky, W. R. Hull, Jr., of Missouri, George Shipley of Illinois, and Frank Evans of Colorado; and Republicans Odin Langen of Minnesota, Robert H. Michael of Illinois, and Jack Edwards of Alabama. Because a majority of these members share Whitten's outlook on agriculture and his arch-conservative view of social action, the chairman's will becomes the subcommittee's will. As chairman, he also



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has a hold over staff appointments.

Much of Whitten's power derives from the system within the House of Representatives. Once a subcommittee makes a decision, the full House Appropriations Committee almost always backs it up. This is particularly true with agriculture appropriations, because House Appropriations Chairman George Mahon (D-Tex.) shares Whitten's views on farm policy, welfare spending, and racial issues. For years, Whitten has been in absolute control of all bills before his subcommittee, from the first markup session to the final House vote. "The lines in my face would be deeper except for you," Mahon inscribed his own portrait in the Mississippian's office.

The House at large rarely has challenged Agriculture budgets because most nonfarm-bloc members find the subject too complex or dull and rarely take the trouble to inform themselves about it. If some members, or the public, are roused to the point where a challenge develops, the House's committee chairmen generally pull together to defeat the move. Committee members follow to insure that they will have the chairman's support for their own pet bills—and to keep sacrosanct the whole system of mutual support and protection.

If a challenge happens to get out of hand, the first commandment of a subcommittee chairman is "Never let yourself in for a battle on the House floor if there is any chance for defeat." Part of the power of a chairman stems from his apparent invincibility—and the image must be preserved! Therefore, Whitten went along with the Nixon Administration's full budget request for food aid in 1969, knowing there was sufficient pressure for a much bigger appropriation. Whitten responded here only to the politics of the issue, not the substance, for he still complained to Senator George McGovern that hunger was not a problem, that "Nigras won't work" if you give them free food, and that McGovern was promoting revolution by continuing to seek free food stamps for the poorest Americans.

Where agriculture legislation is concerned, Whitten must share power to some measure with Senator Spessard Holland, a Florida Democrat who chairs the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Agriculture. Holland is a blunt man who insists that Section 32 funds—food dollars from customs receipts—should be held in reserve to be used at the proper time to boost prices for his state's citrus, vegetable, and beef industries. When Whitten and Holland act in unison—as they often do—the results are predictable. After the School Lunch Act was liberalized in 1964, they managed to refuse funding free school lunches for more than two years. The Johnson Administration had sought only $2-3 million to help some of the estimated five million poor children who got no benefits from the lunch program, but all the funds were held back in committee until Senator Philip Hart (D-Mich.) threatened to take the fight to the floor.

Jamie Whitten's power is greater than Holland's, however, not only because appropriations usually originate in the House, but also because in the smaller body of the Senate there is less hesitation to overturn subcommittee decisions than in the tradition-bound House of Representatives. The House system, therefore, assures more *inherent* power for its subcommittee chairmen, and Jamie Whitten has been vigorous and skillful in pursuing it.

## Getting Along With Whitten

Even the Secretary himself feels he must bend to the power of the "permanent Secretary." When a delegation headed by Richard Boone of the Citizens' Crusade Against Poverty had



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asked Orville Freeman to provide free stamps and commodities to help the hungry in Mississippi, the Secretary told them: "I've got to get along with two people in Washington—the President and Jamie Whitten. How can you help me with Whitten?"

Just back from a study of hunger in Mississippi in April, 1967, Dr. Robert Coles and three other doctors also found out about Whitten's influence when they appealed to Orville Freeman. They walked into the Secretary's office feeling that they would be welcomed as helpful, authoritative reporters of the facts, and they left feeling that they had been tagged as troublemakers.

"We were told that we and all the hungry children we had examined and all the other hungry Americans would have to reckon with Mr. Jamie L. Whitten, as indeed must the Secretary of Agriculture, whose funds come to him through the kindness of the same Mr. Whitten. We were told of the problems that the Agriculture Department has with Congress, and we left feeling we ought to weigh those problems as somehow of the same order as the problems we had met in the South—and that we know from our work elsewhere existed all over the country," recalled Coles.

Whitten's power goes beyond the Secretary to the Presidency itself. In the last year of his Administration, President Johnson steadily refused to adopt proposals for broadened food aid that were drafted within his Administration. Johnson was then trying to get his income surtax bill through the Congress, and he needed the support of Whitten and the rest of the small group of Southern hierarchs. Johnson declined to risk possible loss of critical votes on the war- and inflation-related surtax.

When Senator Jacob Javits (R-N.Y.) asked Agriculture Secretary Freeman, "What are you afraid of in Mississippi?" (at a July, 1967, hearing on hunger in Mississippi) he wanted to know why Freeman would not modify the food program to reach more of the hungry in Mississippi and elsewhere. The only response he got was ex-marine Freeman's outthrust jaw and a growl that he was not afraid of anyone and would not be intimidated.

Nevertheless, faced with Jamie Whitten's power over his department, and fed information by a Whitten-conscious bureaucracy, Freeman had failed for two years to take measures to feed more of the hungry poor in America. Moreover, the Secretary had stubbornly refused to acknowledge the chasm between his department's efforts and the real needs of the hungry.

From Freeman on down, every Agriculture Department official knew that hunger spelled "hound dog" to Jamie Whitten.

"You've got to understand how Jamie feels about 'hound dog' projects," a career official explained. (In Southern country jargon, a "hound dog" is always hanging around, useless, waiting to be thrown scraps.) Years before, the chairman had killed a small pilot project to teach unemployed southern Negroes how to drive tractors. "Now, that's a 'hound dog' project, and I don't want to see any more of them," he had said.

Whitten's opposition to any program resembling social welfare—or aid to Negroes—contributed to the failure of war on poverty programs for rural America. When President Johnson signed an executive order giving the Agriculture Department responsibility for coordinating the rural war on poverty, Secretary Freeman created a Rural Community Development Service to give the Department a focal point for helping the poor. It was designed to coordinate programs meeting all the needs of the rural poor—housing, education, water, food—not only within the Agriculture Department, but throughout the federal government.

Within a year, the Rural Community



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


Development Service was dead. "Whitten thought the Service smacked of social experimentation and civil rights," a Department of Agriculture official said. In addition, Whitten's brother-in-law, one of many cronies who have filled Agriculture jobs over the years, had clashed with Robert G. Lewis, the idealistic Wisconsin progressive who headed the program. Whitten simply cut off the funds, and pigeonholed the coordinating powers of RCDS by placing the responsibility with the docile, conservative Farmers Home Administration. Freeman never fought the issue. There were too many other matters, other appropriations, that were more important to him, so the embryonic effort to coordinate rural poverty programs through the Department of Agriculture ended as little more than a passing idea.

(By assigning the broad rural poverty responsibility to the Department of Agriculture, President Johnson, like President Nixon after him, indicated either a great naiveté about the Department or a lack of seriousness in his proposals. The four congressional committees with which Agriculture must deal undoubtedly are the least receptive of any in Congress to attempts to provide meaningful help to the hardcore rural poor.)

Jamie Whitten has wielded that kind of influence since the mid-1940's, when he killed an emerging Agriculture study which tried to anticipate the social and economic problems of Negro GI's returning from World War II to the feudal cotton South. At that time, the Mississippi Congressman was the youngest chairman of an appropriations subcommittee. By opposing all studies exploring the effects of a changing agriculture upon people, Whitten helped insure that Agriculture's farm policy would never include serious consideration of the effects of its programs on sharecroppers or farm workers. Whitten and the other powerful southern Congress-

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men who share his views insured that the Department would focus only on the cotton planter and his crop. As a result, farm policies which have consistently ignored their toll on millions of black poor have contributed to a rural-urban migration, to a civil rights revolution, and to the ruin of many Americans.

There is no doubt as to the motives of Whitten and the other Congressmen who run the Agriculture Department. Testifying on the proposed food stamp law before the Senate Agriculture Committee in 1964, one Department official boldly suggested that it would not help those with little or no income. Committee Chairman Allen J. Ellender (D-La.) indignantly dismissed this complaint against the bill, revealing clearly his own legislative intent.

"I know that in my state we had a number of fishermen who were unable to catch fish," retorted Ellender. "Do you expect the government, because they cannot catch fish, to feed them until the fish are there? In other words, this food stamp program is not to be considered a program just simply to feed people because they cannot get work. This is not what it is supposed to be."

## Surplus Serfs

What the food stamp program was "supposed to be" was a substitute for a free commodity program that had outlived its usefulness—to Southern plantation owners. Surplus commodities—barely enough to live on—were distributed in the winter when work ceased on the Mississippi plantation of Senator James Eastland (D-Miss.) and on the huge Texas ranches. In the spring, when the $3-a-day planting jobs opened up, the food aid ended. The federal government eased the planter's responsibility by keeping his workers alive during the winter, then permitted the counties that administered the program to withdraw that meager support during planting season—forcing the workers to accept near-starvation wages for survival. When the rural serfs were no longer needed, having been slowly replaced by machines, even that support vanished as the government stopped free commodities in favor of food stamps which the poorest rural people could not afford. As counties throughout the nation changed from commodities to food stamps, participation fell off by 40 per cent; more than one million persons, including 100,000 in Mississippi, were forced to drop out of the food program. Whispers of "planned starvation" emerged from the economic crisis of 1967, when the combination of production cutbacks in cotton, automated machinery, and the end of free commodities left the Deep South with thousands of blacks who were unneeded—and hungry. The decisions of the white supremacists in Congress, supported by the subservient Department of Agriculture, contributed to that result.

Whitten's decisions are not always understood by the uninitiated. With his wily ability to juggle figures and cloud ideas, Whitten convinces officials unfamiliar with his technique (and lacking intimate knowledge of the facts) that he is quite a reasonable man—especially when the converstion turns to hunger and the food programs. As he tells it, he was a pioneer on the the nutrition issue.

In 1950 he fought for funds for a Department of Agriculture cookbook, and he warned the House it had better concern itself with human as well as animal health. To this day, Whitten insists that the Agriculture Department keep the book in print; he sends a free copy to newlyweds in his district.

The subcommittee chairman also denies that he paralyzed Freeman on the hunger issue: "I *helped* the Secretary by making two points with him," Whitten insists. "I told him he had to charge people what they were accustomed to paying for food stamps be-



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cause that's what the law says. And I pointed out to him that the law forbids selling food stamps and distributing commodities in the same counties." By making these two helpful points, Whitten blocked the most feasible emergency measures.

"Why, I gave him more money for those food programs than he could spend!" said Whitten.

Actually, the hopelessly inadequate $45 million for food programs Whitten "gave" to Freeman was fought, bought, and paid for by the Administration and Congressional liberals; this was what was left after Whitten and Holland whittled down the original $100 million, three-year authorization won by liberals on the House floor.

Whitten's explanations of food programs may have appeared perfectly reasonable to Freeman, Sargent Shriver, and many members of Congress, but their total impact was to stop any reform that would get food to the hungry. His own strongly held view is that the food programs should serve the farm programs, not vice versa, and his actions over the years have halted any kind of aid the Agriculture Department might have directed toward the poor. In the early 1960's, when the Kennedy Administration was momentarily concerned for the poor of Appalachia, Agriculture found a way to provide housing grants to aid the hardest-core poor; but once Whitten discovered the grant program in operation, he killed all further appropriations for it.

A few years later, a new cotton program provided advance payments to cotton farmers for withdrawing some of their acreage from production. Sharecroppers, who provided most of the cotton labor force, were supposed to receive their "share" of government payments for idle land. With Whitten's inspiration or blessing, Agriculture adopted a regulation permitting the plantation owner to deduct from the sharecropper's government payments the amount he claimed was owed for the sharecropper's rent, farming expenses, etc. Under the feudal system of the plantation, however, the sharecropper *never* had any legal guarantee that he would receive his fair share of profit for the crop he produced. Blacks who declined to turn over their checks were kicked off hundreds of plantations. The Agriculture Department did not halt the practice.

One of Whitten's sharecropper constituents, trying desperately to find food for her family, gave her own intuitive view of her Congressman's attitudes: "He's probably with the bossman's side, don't you know. He's with them. No one's with us but ourselves, and no matter how many of us there are, we don't have what they have."

## Wine for Mississippi

Although much of the legislation he favors has enriched American agricultural business with government funds, Whitten's stock answer to any proposed liberalization of the Department of Agriculture food programs is that they are "food programs, not welfare programs." He is adamant about suggestions that food programs be moved to the more liberal Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. "Who'll see to it that [funds for food] don't go for frivolity and wine?" he asks.

Whitten's view on welfare, so strongly felt through the Department of Agriculture, are shared by many Americans. Yet when viewed against the background of Tallahatchie County and its social history, these views, and their interpretations through Agriculture programs, take on a different meaning. Since hunger means poverty, and poverty in Mississippi usually means black, any expanded aid to the hungry means one more threat to the socio-economic order in which the black worker has

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

always been held in absolute dependency upon crumbs from the plantation owner.

The 100,000 or more black Mississippi farm workers who suddenly found themselves with nothing to hold onto in the winter of 1967 were little concerned with frivolity and wine. They had lost their sole supply of food, as Mississippi counties switched over from the inadequate but free surplus commodities to a food stamp program the poor could not afford. "No work, no money, and now, no food," was their outcry, and they desperately sought a reduction in the price of stamps at the very moment when Jamie Whitten was starting his annual review of the Department of Agriculture's budget, with its accompanying discourses on the nature of the poor man. He had heard, the chairman said, that "organized groups" sought to make food stamps free to the poor.

"This is one of the things you always run into," he said to Secretary Freeman. "You make stamps available at 30 per cent discount; then they want them at 50, then 75. Now, I have heard reports that some of the organized minority groups are insisting they be provided free of charge. When you start giving people something for nothing, just giving them all they want for nothing, I wonder if you don't destroy character more than you might improve nutrition. I think more and more American people are coming to that conclusion."

They built a lot of character in Mississippi that winter, where the disruption caused by the abrupt changeover to food stamps contributed to the kind of wholesale destitution not seen in this country since the Great Depression.

But the chairman did not seem to think his black constituents were learning the character lesson well enough when it came to the school lunch and new school breakfast programs. Out of work and out of money, few Mississippi



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Negroes could afford to give their children 25 cents a day for a school lunch, and few schools provided the free lunches which the law technically required for the poor. Agriculture officials virtually begged that the special school lunch assistance budget be raised from $2 million to $10 million annually to give meals to an added 360,000 children in poor areas. Whitten expressed concern only about the impact of civil rights sanctions as he slashed the request by two-thirds.

When another project—a requested million dollars for a pilot school breakfast program to help the neediest youngsters—came up, Whitten's patience wore thin. "Do you contemplate having a pilot dinner program—evening meals—called supper where I grew up?" Whitten asked sarcastically.

When Agriculture Department officials explained that "a hungry child in the morning is not able to take full advantage of the schooling that is offered," Whitten wanted to know why the government should be supplying what the family should have supplied before they left home.

"We all recognize that the type of home from which some children come affects them in many, many ways, but there is a problem always as to whether the federal government should start doing everything for the citizens. You may end up with a certain class of people doing nothing to help themselves. To strike a happy medium is always a real problem."

In this case, Whitten struck it by cutting all $6.5 million requested for breakfast funds from the budget.

Each time a group of doctors, team of reporters, or other investigators produced firsthand reports of hunger in the South, Whitten launched his own "investigation" and announced that parental neglect is largely responsible for any problems. In 1968, when the drive for a bigger food program began to gather steam nationally, Whitten sent out the FBI to disprove the evidence of the problem. The FBI men, who are assigned to the House Appropriations Committee, in effect intimidated people who had provided evidence of hunger.

When a private group investigating hunger, the Citizens' Board of Inquiry. reported after a lengthy investigation that "we have found concrete evidence of chronic hunger and malnutrition in every part of the United States where we have held hearings or conducted hearings," even the Pentagon rallied to the defense of Jamie Whitten's system. The Pentagon-financed Institute for Defense Analyses published an attack on *Hunger USA*, the book that contained the Board of Inquiry report. The author of the Defense document, Dr. Herbert Pollack, took the position that ignorance was at the root of any hunger problems in the U.S.—the same position taken by Whitten and his Congressional allies.

The Mississippi Congressman demands that the poor, if they are to get any benefits, must prove they are hungry on a case-by-case basis. "The doctors have not submitted any names," he wrote one concerned northern lady, assuring her that he would be "most sympathetic and helpful in trying to work this matter out."

Time after time, Whitten has requested names and addresses of the poor who complain of ill-treatment in his home state. Yet in Jamie Whitten's home county, the thought of having their names known strikes terror among those who have had dealings with the local officials.

A news team from television's Public Broadcast Laboratory, interviewing a black housewife in Whitten's home town of Charleston, felt the danger involved in "naming names." As Mrs. Metcalf began to explain why the food stamp and school lunch programs were not helping her family, a task force of sedans and panel trucks began to cruise back

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and forth on the U.S. highway about 50 yards from her plantation shack. Suddenly the trucks lunged off the highway into the shack's front yard, surrounding the television crew's two station wagons. A rifle or shotgun was mounted in the rear window of each truck.

"You're trespassing. Git!" growled the plantation manager as he pushed his way past the TV reporter and ordered Mrs. Metcalf to get outside the shack if she knew what was good for her.

"You were trespassing when you crossed the Mississippi state line," shouted Deputy Sheriff Buck Shaw as he ordered the PBL crew to clear out.

In an attempt to insure Mrs. Metcalf's safety from the local "law," the reporter phoned Congressman Whitten in Washington.

"You remember when Martin Luther King went through my town!" the Congressman answered. "You read *The Wall Street Journal?* It said that he went through there and everybody turned out to look at him. And as soon as he left, they just turned over and went back to sleep. I just know, I live down there and I know. Good God, Chicago, Washington, Detroit. Every one of them would give any amount of money if they could go to sleep feeling as safe—both races—as my folks will!"

It wasn't so peaceful about three o'clock that afternoon with those hard-eyed men threatening Mrs. Metcalf, the reporter explained.

"I suspect Deputy Shaw's like I am," Whitten snapped. "They recognized when you crossed that state line you had no good intention in your mind. I'm no kingfish. I just know my people and my people get along. Unfortunately, you folks and the folks up here don't know how to get along. I bet you money if I ran tomorrow, and nobody voted except the colored people, I'd get the majority. I grew up where five or six of my closest neighbors were Negroes. We played together as kids. We swapped vegetables. Why, I grew up hugging my Momma, and my Momma hugging them."

There were as many Negroes as whites at his father's funeral, Whitten asserts—and he keeps on his desk a yellowed 1936 newspaper editorial that praised District Attorney Jamie Whitten for successfully prosecuting the white man who burned some Mississippi Negroes to death.

Against Whitten's statements about how he is respected by Negroes and would get their vote, about how close his relationship and understanding with Negroes has been, about how quiet and peaceful life is in Charleston, another point of view appeared, as one of his black constituents spoke on the same subject—rambling much as Jamie Whitten does. An eloquent, middle-aged woman told Dr. Robert Coles about the plantation owner for whom her husband works, about his wife, about food, and about life in America:

"He [the plantation owner] doesn't want us trying to vote and like that—and first I'd like to feed my kids, before I go trying to vote.

"His wife—the boss man's—she'll come over here sometimes and give me some extra grits and once or twice in the year some good bacon. She tells me we get along fine down here and I says 'yes' to her. What else would I be saying, I ask you?

"But it's no good. The kids aren't eating enough, and you'd have to be wrong in the head, pure crazy to say they are. Sometimes we talk of leaving; but you know it's just no good up there either, we hear. They eat better, but they have had things up there I hear, rats as big as raccoons I hear, and they bit my sister's kid real bad.

"It's no kind of country to be proud of, with all this going on—the colored people still having it so bad, and the kids



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being sick and there's nothing you can do about it."*

## Affection, Not Cash

Whitten's affection for black constituents like this woman does not extend to federal measures to assist their lot in life. Of the 24,081 residents of Tallahatchie County, 18,000 have family incomes less than the poverty level of $3,000 a year, and 15,197 make less than $2,000. Of these thousands legally defined as poor, only 2,367 qualify for public assistance, and 6,710 receive food stamps. Only a few blocks from Whitten's own white frame home, Negroes live in shacks without toilets, running water, electricity—or food.

Whitten and his fellow white Mississippians point with great pride to the economic progress their state has made in recent years. Improved farming methods, conversion of marginal cropland to timber and other uses, and a strong soil bank program have greatly enriched the commercial farmer in Mississippi. Other government programs, including state tax inducements, have promoted wide industrialization, and rural white workers have found a new affluence in the hundreds of factories and small shops that have sprung up.

But the new farming has eliminated thousands of jobs for Negro plantation workers while the segregated social system denies them factory jobs. The able-bodied usually head north, leaving the very young, the very old, and the unskilled to cope with "progress." The rural black does not share in the new prosperity of Mississippi, and some Negroes are worse off than at any time since the Depression. Indeed, in many parts of the Deep South the black man is literally being starved out by the new prosperity.

Perhaps the white southern politician is no more to blame than are whites anywhere. But the white in the South could not afford to see the truth of the Negroe's suffering, because to feel that truth would have shattered a whole way of life.

Jamie Whitten truly believes in his own fairness, his idea of good works, and the imagined affection he receives from Negroes back home. For 59 years, he has anesthetized his soul to the human misery and indignity only a few yards from his own home and has refused to believe that the responsibility for that indignity lies on his white shoulders. His belief in the basic laziness, indifference, and unworthiness of the black poor is as strong as his belief in the virtues of a way of life that for three centuries has denied these same black poor any avenues of pursuing ambition, self-respect, or a better future for their children.

That Jamie Whitten should suffer from blindness to human need is one thing. But that he can use this blindness as an excuse to limit the destiny of millions of Americans is another matter, one which should concern anyone who believes in the basic strengths of this country's constitutional guarantees. The checks and balances of a reasonable democratic republic have gone completely awry when a huge bureaucracy and the top officials of an administration base their actions concerning deepest human need on their fearful perception of what one rather limited man seems to want.

The system of seniority and temerity that gives a man such as Jamie Whitten such awesome power must come under more serious public scrutiny if the American system of government is ever to establish itself on the basis of moral concern about the individual human being. ■

*Robert Coles and Harry Huge, "We Need Help," *The New Republic*, March 8, 1969.

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# NEW TOWNS:

Writing two and a half years ago from Tarn House, Norwich, Vermont, H. Wentworth Eldredge, the Dartmouth urban scholar, looked at the near future of urban America:

"At the present, there seems little likelihood, under the American federal governmental system, of making the necessary synthesis of city development, new towns and comprehensive transportation thinking in a national planned system, by regions....

"And yet on the other hand, lacking population control, some form of ordered expansion of urbanization cannot be far ahead and federal legislation to that effect seems to be just around the corner, resting heavily on private experience, as it should, in our very mixed economy."

Eldredge's forecast was nothing if not prescient.

Within the Nixon Administration, and in Congress as well, a "national urban policy" is increasingly regarded as an idea whose time has come. More specifically, the new town is winning favor as a concept that may do for the urban dilemma what the moon landing did for space exploration—supply a needed focus and furnish a symbol to stimulate commitment.

The idea of new towns fits well with what little accepted wisdom there is in the inchoate field of urban affairs. Demographers predict a population increase of 100 million by the year 2000, consuming some 18 million acres of land. The bulk of this growth will occur on the fringe of some 20 metropolitan areas. The new-town advocates ask: Need this growth replicate the urban sprawl of the 1950's, with its waste of land, diseconomies of scale, and disre-

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# Can They Work? by Edmund B. Lambeth

gard of social needs?

Within the next 10 years alone, 26 million dwelling units will be needed. Can planned new towns help form the large markets required to give birth to a genuine mass-production housing industry in the United States? Many new-town advocates think so.

Politically, the climate for new towns, linked closely to a national urban policy, has never been better. Not the least of the reasons is that the idea is one of the few that the Johnson Administration declined to embrace.

President Nixon, in his population message, called the concept "stimulating." Vice President Spiro T. Agnew, unofficial poet laureate of the new town of Columbia, Maryland, has presided over a series of meetings on the subject attended by businessmen, Congressmen, bankers, labor leaders, and spokesmen for municipal governments. The President's Urban Affairs Council, of which Dr. Daniel Patrick Moynihan is executive secretary, has appointed a cabinet-level subcommittee on land use and new towns. The subcommittee, chaired by Secretary of Transportation John A. Volpe, is expected to confront the issue in depth this fall. A new-towns task force has been formed within Volpe's department, and Sherman Unger, the ambitious and alert general counsel of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, is taking a team of experts to Britain to study new-town financing and building techniques.

HUD's Assistant Secretary for Metropolitan Development, Samuel C. Jackson, has urged that states charter urban development corporations, which would give them the eminent-domain powers needed to assemble land for new com-

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munities.

To help assure their success, Jackson held open the possibility of direct loans to pay interest and other carrying charges, loans for capital investment, "and possibly even capital grants." Jackson's view is that the existing, modest program of federal assistance to new communities—which will guarantee debentures issued by builders in such communities—is probably not enough. "It is clear," he said, "that if the full range of potential benefits of new towns is to be realized, something more than the existing program is needed."

The precedent for Jackson's proposed state initiative is New York's Urban Development Corporation, a Rockefeller-created authority with power to override local zoning codes, condemn and assemble land, and sponsor the construction of houses, factories, schools and parks.

Headed by planner Edward J. Logue, late of Boston and New Haven, UDC will break ground next spring on a new town 12 miles northwest of Syracuse. Its population is expected to reach 16,000 in 10 years. A much bigger community will take shape under UDC auspices in Amherst, a Buffalo suburb that is the site of a new state university campus.

Several strategically placed Senators, Congressmen, Governors, and Mayors have put their signatures on a report called "The New City," which urges the creation, with federal assistence, of 100 new towns of 100,000 population and 10 with a population of one million.

The report, which includes several essays financed by the Ford Foundation, was sponsored by Urban America, Inc., and—more significantly—the U.S. Conference of Mayors, the National League of Cities, and the National Association of Counties. The municipal lobbies, adamantly opposed to new towns when the issue first came up in 1964, changed to support in 1967. Their stated reason is that, properly conceived and administered, new towns could relieve existing cities, particularly when it comes to the shortage of decent houses and jobs.

In the House of Representatives, one of the signers of "The New City" report, Thomas Ludlow Ashley (D-Ohio), persuaded Wright Patman (D-Tex.), chairman of the Banking and Currency Committee, to appoint a special ad hoc subcommittee on urban growth, of which Ashley is chairman. New towns will figure prominently in the hearings, which will attempt to massage the Congressional central nervous system enough to make "urban growth"—and thus new towns—an actionable issue.

But the average member of Congress is like the citizen he represents. Few have visited a new town and those who have would be hard pressed to define what one is.

By HUD's definition—a degree of self-sufficiency and a land area of at least 1,000 acres—there are only 64 new towns in America, 40 of them built in the last decade. They range in projected population from 10,000 (Joppatowne, in Harford County, Maryland) to 600,000 (California City, in Kern County, California). Eighteen states have new towns but most are in the playland states of Arizona, Florida, and California.

By the most generous analysis, however, new towns built so far show little promise of relieving the American city of its unemployed or ill-housed. Even the widely praised Columbia, Maryland, built between Washington and Baltimore by developer James Rouse, makes no pretension of relieving the ghettos of either city. As Morton Hoppenfeld, Columbia's chief planner, candidly explains:

"Columbia was designed to be attractive to that majority segment of the



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population which is economically viable in the market. As a venture of private capital, Columbia will be unable to reach and affect some of the gut social problems of American urbanization."

Many developers, moreover, do not have the "patient" money available to Rouse. Thus Dale City, Virginia, where 2,500 families have bought homes in a planned "dream community," now finds itself barren of such promised amenities as golf courses, riding trails, and Olympic-sized swimming pools. In the words of Dale City's planner, who had hoped for a city of 80,000, the community now is "just like any other typical real estate development."

The problems facing a private new-town developer are formidable. He must assemble enough land, arrange financing that is patient enough to wait 10 years for a profit, and find management experts who are willing to risk their reputations on one of the most difficult of all real estate ventures.

The American new towns that have been able to meet all these conditions have been "flukes," that is, special exceptions that prove the grim rules.

The 12,000 acres on which Litchfield Park, Arizona (population 100,000), is rising had been owned intact by the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. since World War I days. Irvine, California, with 88 acres of debt-free land, is the inheritance of an old southern California ranch family. Few families have acreage on hand covering four times the land area of Manhattan.

Other new towns are built by big national corporations with ready cash. The Pennsylvania railroad found itself with money aplenty when forced under anti-trust laws to sell the Norfolk & Western Railroad. As a result, it bought Macco Realty—the developer of Porter Ranch in Los Angeles county and the owner of 100,000 acres in southern California.

Other big corporations enter the new-town business to push the sale of their products. Boise-Cascade, a lumber and timber company, has bought two home-building firms (Perma-Built Enterprises and U.S. Land Corporation) and is building resort communities near Cleveland, Chicago, Gary, Kansas City, and Fredericksburg, Virginia. Westinghouse is building Coral Springs, Florida (population 60,000), as an "urban laboratory" for its products. Walt Disney Productions, Inc., likewise is building a new community near Orlando, Florida, to introduce, test, and show off new technologies. Humble Oil Company had land, investment money as well as a product sales motive in mind when it began building Clear Lake City on 15,000 acres near Houston.

But other large companies, less favorably situated with respect to the key ingredients of the new-town business, have found the entry barriers formidable. General Electric dissolved its Community Systems Development division last February, after a two-year exploration of whether to enter the city-building business. GE concluded that the risk was too high and the profits too slow; it also found that low-cost land and special financing were too difficult to assemble. New communities on a large scale will not flourish, GE decided, until government agrees to help.

In view of the impending policy decisions on new towns in the federal government, GE's recommendations are worth quoting in some detail:

> It just makes sense that the power of eminent domain must be granted to private corporations or to state development corporations in order to assemble land in the right location and to take advantage of existing and planned public investment in highways, water works, sewage disposal facilities, airports, and railways.
>
> Perhaps something similar to urban renewal must be created, whereby

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land is assembled, master planned, zoned, and resold at a write-down to private builders by a local development authority.

Tax restraint must be exercised to relieve the financial burden on the developer in the early stages; taxes can then be raised on a gradual basis after actual improvements are put in place.

At the state level, legislation must be created that will permit the developer to retain a measure of control over planning, zoning, and community services for an agreed-upon development period, so that a dissident group cannot thwart financial planning or the very concept itself.

GE said it would maintain an "avid interest" in the city business and would re-enter it "under the proper combination of conditions"—meaning a federal subsidy similar to that for urban renewal. Its recommendations have the virtue of at least forcing the new-town advocates to face some of the harder questions.

What would the public gain in return for such a subsidy? An adequate supply of low-income housing? Why will new towns allow or encourage this when it has eluded new neighborhoods, city or suburban, for 30 years?

When the state or local development authority begins searching for tracts large enough for new towns, what will govern the price paid for the land? Will the big corporations now buying land as a hedge against inflation be given the benefit of price accrual due to the government's known plans for a new town?

If autonomous new towns are the goal, can it be assumed that industry and business will voluntarily locate there to provide jobs for the new residents? If not, what will have to be done to induce them to a new-town location? Why will a new town make an industrialist more willing to invest in jobless workers than a city location?

Significantly, the report sponsored by the municipal lobbies and Urban America, Inc., called for long-term loans or loan guarantees, rather than outright subsidies. Loans would defer repayment and interest for 15 years—which amounts to a substantial indirect subsidy. And no one familiar with the way federal "loan programs" begin can have much doubt that direct subsidies would evolve.

John Gunther, executive director of the U.S. Conference of Mayors, said in an interview that the mayors' switch on new towns was merely an attempt to be constructive.

"We kept getting asked about new towns in Congress and we didn't want to be negative. We've studied the matter now and we see positive advantages, provided that it's done right. We *think* the ideas in 'The New City' are the right ones. Our goal is to make existing cities as good an investment as new towns and to use new towns to solve some of our problems."

Although Gunther says that the 1967 riots did not cause the mayors' change of heart, it is clear that the violence made a ghetto-dispersal policy much more attractive to big-city governments. In any event, the advocates of new towns have already begun to anticipate opposition from black-power separatists who claim, or will claim, that new towns are an attempt by the white man to decimate black majorities before they form.

Arithmetic answers the separatists. Even if new towns were to become home for 10 million Negroes in the next 30 years—a prodigious accomplishment—black voting strength in the central cities would not appreciably diminish.

Perhaps more significantly, such influential black militants as Clarence Funnye, director of planning for the National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing, have spoken up forcefully against the separatists. The ghetto, Funnye insists, has the least land available for the kind of large-scale industry



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which could create new jobs. That land is in outlying areas. He advocates "deghettoization" via new towns and an aggressive open-occupancy program for the suburbs.

But aside from the expected opposition of some black separatists, the policies outlined in "The New City" have a remarkable unifying power. The proposed development corporations would not only be empowered to build new towns in the countryside, but also on the metropolitan fringe, within existing cities and around small rural towns that are either dying or failing in growth.

Even though new towns on the magnitude envisioned in "The New City" would accommodate only one-fifth of the nation's urban growth over the next 30 years, this is a substantial fraction. It is a fraction, moreover, that would drain away a commodity more scarce in America than land or mortgage money—urban management talent.

The excitement of a new town is real. To the urban developer, a new town is what forgiveness is to the sinner or town drunk: a fresh start spiritually, the opportunity to begin from scratch. The old town offers no such respite. As the Rand experts imported by Mayor John Lindsay learned, the cliché "problems of the cities" masks a reality even more severe than they thought.

Nathaniel A.Owings of San Franciso, principal in the architectural firm of Skidmore, Owings and Merrill, told a recent St. Louis symposium on new towns: "To my mind they are even immoral.... The new town is one of these illusions used to palliate the issues and get away from the problems."

And Edmund N. Bacon, the respected Philadelphia planner, added that the new town is "representative of the American propensity, when faced with a problem, of changing the subject."

These criticisms are recognized by the more cautious exponents of new towns. Thus Paul Ylvisaker, a founder of the war on poverty and now Commissioner of New Jersey's Department of Community Affairs, told a Congressional committee:

> I've considered carefully the subconscious motives behind it (the new town idea). If we are to build new communities, and I hope we will, we ought to be clear about our own motivation, since the possible motives are several....
>
> After all, there is an escapist tendency in new-town thinking which leads people to where there are, or seem to be, no confining parameters and no conventionalism; the politics are new, the land is clear, and even the zoning laws might be changed. The danger here is that needed resources and energies will be diverted from the problems of our cities.
>
> There are some caveats to the building of new towns, but there is more to the idea than escapism and there are ways of nourishing the new without starving the old. The effort to build new towns may be a cathartic in our present system. We may have reached a dead end in evolving an urban culture, at least in some respects.
>
> We must break loose the old and invent the new. We cannot rely entirely on the incremental method to achieve the full measure of progress that is now necessary. Radical departures are called for, both in reshaping our old communities and in designing the new. Certainly the new town in this sense is a healthy concept and I am among those who welcome it.

If Ylvisaker's assessment is near the mark, several overriding questions face the Nixon administration.

Can it find or afford the money to fund a new-towns program on a scale large enough to influence the direction and character of urban growth?

If it can, will the now-fragile "new federalism" become strong enough to overcome the new town's inherent tendency to overpromise and underdeliver?■

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# NATIONAL SECURITY: Are We Asking the Right Questions?

by Paul C. Warnke

In the area of national security, it is probably a good deal easier to raise questions than to supply answers. Anyone who has ever tried the latter can only hope that his successors will be better at it. But he may also find himself hoping that he, and the American public generally, can begin to do a better job of asking the right questions. Until we do, there is little purpose and even less justice in railing about the size of our defense budget. The military-industrial complex, with the soaring cost of its care and feeding and its dire consequences for the quality of American life, is the inevitable answer to the questions we have asked and the demands we have made in the name of national security. Our military-industrial complex exists because we have asked for it.

We can never cut it back to size and free up a fair share of our budget dollars for competing and compelling causes until we begin asking the right questions—about how our defense effort squares with the real world and with our genuine national security. Without the right questions directed to the right people we can never get answers that will permit us to design, or even to recognize, a defense budget commensurate with our over-all interests and objectives.

In not too oversimplified terms, the concept of security we evolved after World War II was to make sure that non-Communist countries stayed that way. During the years when "Who lost China?" was the popular security question, nobody in the national-security business, at least, craved identification as one who had "lost" some other strayed member of the non-Communist community.

The Eisenhower Administration pursued the concept of security by adhering to the doctrine of "massive retaliation." As the answer to the question of how we could prevent Communist take-overs,

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we could point to our nuclear striking force. But this answer became less and less plausible as our monopoly in intercontinental missiles dissipated. Neither we nor our potential adversaries could continue to believe that the United States would react to any and every Communist provocation by initiating a nuclear exchange in which our own society would be devastated.

Nor could we accept an "all-or-nothing" doctrine of defense that would leave us bereft of any ability to respond with conventional force to conventional attacks on friendly nations. So "massive retaliation" gave way to the more common-sense notion of a "flexible response" adequate to counter, and hopefully to deter, instances of aggression for which we would be unwilling to risk a nuclear holocaust.

But the cost of the capability to respond flexibly can be immense if an American military response must be contemplated whenever an international development disfavors our national interests. And this expense can be infinite if the adequacy of that capability must be measured in terms of a clear superiority in every aspect of armed might.

In a world in which we are not the single "great power," any such total military versatility and invincibility is clearly unprocurable—at any price. Until we begin to refine our questions and direct them toward realistic and realizable security goals, we will continue to ask the impossible and get answers that are unacceptable.

In the broadest sense, we now ask our government: make us safe from any attack by any foe. The answer is a defense budget in the neighborhood of $80 billion a year. It is an answer that is increasingly unsatisfactory. It certainly does not satisfy the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who recognize that this amount is inadequate to buy the American people anything like full protection. The Armed Services Committees of Congress can prove that a lower budget means less over-all military strength and less capacity to do things by military force, for a defense budget of $80 billion obviously provides the capability to meet contingencies that a budget of $50 billion must ignore. But before concluding that the $50 billion budget will leave us weaker and in greater danger, we need political judgments as to what unmet contingencies are apt to occur and—if they do occur and if they are unmet—what vital national interests may be adversely affected. We need the further political judgment of whether the $30 billion thus freed can be spent on problems of greater risk to our national security and in areas of greater benefit to the over-all quality of American life. We need the answers that will put in perspective any incremental gain in physical security.

In the age of intercontinental ballistic missiles, we cannot now, with any amount of money, buy physical safety from a Soviet attack of indescribable devastation. But the real pressures for a ballistic-missile defense—and perhaps even its lulling designation as the "Safeguard" system—derive from our unwillingness to accept emotionally what we have every factual reason to comprehend.

Nor can we curb the infinite expansion of the military-industrial complex by continuing to demand margins of superiority over our potential adversaries all across the spectrum of military armament. We should ask, instead, which leads are meaningful in terms of security or political advantage, and which are not. "Superiority" in nuclear missiles, for example, is too expensive if all it gives us is a status symbol. And "inferiority" is no cause for alarm or even embarrassment if what we have is enough to deter any Soviet effort at a pre-emptive strike.

We should keep in mind that what the Soviets themselves are doing may

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not always provide a useful measure of the appropriateness of our own defense expenditures. We sometimes seem to proceed on the assumption that we are not doing enough unless we more than match what the Soviets spend in every area of armed might. We rarely inquire whether the Soviets are spending too much. Instead, when there is criticism of our ABM deployment, we accept as valid the answer that, after all, the Soviets have already deployed an ABM of their own. Maybe we should ask whether theirs is a poor investment. While vaunting our superior sophistication in other things, both economic and social, we at times come perilously close to adopting Soviet answers when it comes to the allocation of our defense dollars on strategic weapons systems.

In the area of conventional forces, we waste the time and the talents of our military leaders when we leave them to prepare their budget requests on the basis of assumptions devoid of political validity. Our military planners, in fact, are major victims of our defective interrogatory technique. The problem is not that their advice is too often ignored. It is that their answers frequently don't matter because we've asked them the wrong questions. It's neither fair nor fruitful to ask them to develop a military machine that will help achieve a set of foreign-policy objectives which haven't been articulated—and which, when developed, can prove impervious to military solution.

In order to obtain the proper weapons systems—in the proper quantities and supporting the proper number of military personnel—we need a much clearer idea of the circumstances under which we will be willing to use them. The Systems-Analysis group within the Office of the Secretary of Defense serves an essential function in developing the most effective means of performing the various military missions. These civilian experts constantly discuss issues of relative cost effectiveness with the different Armed Services. But neither the civilian nor the military personnel of the Pentagon should be asked to speculate on the nature and number of instances in which they'll be asked to provide military force in furtherance of national objectives. Our current force posture—designed to fight two wars while handling another contingency somewhere else in the world—is the product of such speculation.

This "two-and-a-half war" concept did not arise from an informed prediction of international developments. It derived, during the last decade, from what Pentagon planners saw as the need to buttress conventional military forces neglected during our years of reliance on a nuclear strategy of "massive retaliation." But we lacked then, as we lack now, an accepted perception of our national-security interests; we had no measure for the adequacy of our conventional military capability. As a consequence, our forces are not shaped to fit a policy—and the risk always exists that the policy itself may be influenced by the military forces on hand. We need not conclude that our analyses of force requirements in the early '60's were wrong. But we do need to ask if, in today's world, our national scale of priorities justifies the expense of preparing to fight the Soviets in Europe, while we simultaneously fend off Chinese aggression in Asia and deal elsewhere with some lesser adversary.

It may be that I unduly discount the risk that Russia and China may resolve their differences to the point where they could even consider concurrently engaging us in large-scale conventional warfare. But it is difficult to imagine that either nation would deem the nuclear threshold sufficiently high to block an early resort to strategic forces. Before we commit ourselves to further funding against such an eventuality,



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we should ask the National Security Council to consider the likelihood of this kind of dispersed Armageddon, and to shun a policy that might make it thinkable.

A bumper sticker of the recent past read: "Support Mental Health or I'll Kill You." Sanity in foreign policy compels the recognition that we can't use military means to make the world behave the way we'd like it to behave. We can't use it to compel a country to be free and democratic. And we're aware, at least tacitly, that however we may deplore aggression and strife anywhere in the world, most of it cannot affect our national security and most of it does not call for an American military response. But I don't think we've told those who originate our defense planning enough to permit their reasoned response to our basic questions about how national security can best be assured.

When we ask them to define the necessary dimensions of our military forces, referring them to our existing treaty commitments is not enough. No treaty negates our right to determine the character of our reaction on the basis of our perception of the national interest. Our one absolute commitment is to the preservation of our own independence. And we might fairly ask whether that independence does, in fact, turn on the viability of every international basket case with anti-Communist credentials.

To accept the facts of modern life, we need not adopt the extreme position that no defense effort is availing and that no measure of security can be obtained through expenditures for weapons systems. What *is* required is that debate about the level of defense expenditures—and about the kinds or quantities of armaments that we can prudently purchase—focus on the real risks and on the means realistically available to meet them. In national defense, as in our personal finances, we can afford to carry just so much insurance—particularly against the rarer tropical diseases. Our present preoccupation with physical security may be anachronistic when only two nations in the world can pose a physical threat and when neither could carry it out except at the cost of its own existence as a modern society.

In posing new questions about our national security, we need not repudiate the expert witnesses on whom we have relied in the past. Granted, the results achieved have not been uniformly satisfactory. But we should resist the temptation to blame our Vietnam troubles, for example, on the advice of our military men. In my view, we've consistently been asking them the wrong questions about Vietnam. Such issues as measuring the pace and permanence of pacification involve political judgments that only an objective Vietnamese politician could make, if one could be found. Our commanders are probably right in thinking that a virtual U.S. military occupation is the best way to control an insurgency, but it does little to advance our announced political goal of self-determination for the South Vietnamese.

It has been suggested—by Candidate Goldwater in 1964 and by Senators on both sides of the aisle in years since—that victory in Vietnam requires only that we tell our military leaders that we have decided to win and then leave the war to them. This ignores, I think, our lack of an agreed definition of victory and our unwillingness to go all-out to achieve military conquest. Indeed, no satisfactory answer can be given to the question why we are in Vietnam, because we never asked the question in time. In late 1967, Secretary Rusk explained our presence as necessary to contain a projected one billion Chinese armed with nuclear weapons. But if the original purpose

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of American participation in Vietnam was to contain China, we never asked whether adoption of an attrition route to victory was consistent with that purpose. Certainly there are more promising avenues to the close-in control of China than by killing off the nationalistic North Vietnamese.

Much of the failure to examine the underlying political rationale stems from a fear of poaching on military preserves. But, in the absence of all-out war, our military means surely must be kept consistent with our political objectives. They can't be and they won't be unless we insist that our policymakers articulate these objectives.

Perhaps the first step toward useful answers in the realm of national security would be to abandon the partisan prose. "Missile gap" allegations from the 1960 campaign, like the outlandish charge of a "security gap" in 1968, have only made it more difficult for incoming administrations to pose the relevant questions. What should worry us is a "question gap" that leaves us without meaningful answers, both on national-security policy and on how it should be translated into military capability. In making decisions on defense planning we're constantly in danger of putting the hardware before the horse sense.

There are growing signs of a healthy willingness to question some of the items in the defense budget. But the absence of an over-all policy from which these individual items derive makes the debate revolve largely around tangential issues.

For example, in examining the request for additional attack carriers, it is sensible to ask whether one nuclear-powered carrier is preferable to the two that could be built with conventional power for the same price. It's important to note the age of some carriers in our fleet and the alternative possibility of land-based aircraft. But the real questions remain unanswered. They concern the relationship between our tactical air power and our security interests. Fifteen nuclear attack carriers will indeed permit the flexible application of that power anywhere in the world. But where in the world, and against whom, will we want to apply it, and what should we pay for this capacity?

Without an updated justification for our carrier fleet, we can make no value judgments on the need for new fleet defense aircraft. The mission intended for the F-111B (the Navy version of the TFX) was to stand well off from the fleet for hours with a highly sophisticated missile capable of shooting down hordes of enemy bombers at great range. But debate about the F-111B focused on its weight, its expense, and whether Boeing might have done it better. The Navy succeeded in substituting the F-14A, which on paper provides a superior dog-fighter but continues with the basic mission of fleet defense. The case for continuing this multi-billion-dollar program should not rest on the merits of the airplane. The question we should ask is: what are the chances that our fleet will be sent to sea when there is a real risk of the kind of mass air attack that only the Soviets could mount? Perhaps we should be persuaded that this is plausible, but I think those responsible for our foreign policy should be asked to convince us.

The Senate, by almost a two-to-one margin, recently approved going ahead with the Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft (AMSA). Supporters of a new nuclear bomber, while granting its redundancy, refer to the risk that our intercontinental ballistic missiles may work imperfectly. But no new bomber can provide the ability to destroy the Soviet missile forces and thus prevent nuclear retaliation. Nor, we are told, do we aim at any such "first-strike" capability. Our strategic forces are intended to deter and thus, in an age of sophisticated air defense, strategic



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missiles must remain our primary deterrent. How, we might ask, is that deterrent affected by a decision to proceed with a new manned aircraft on the premise that it is needed because the nuclear missiles may not work? Moreover, our continued expenditures for anti-bomber defense are rationalized as serving to discourage the Soviet Union from developing a new supersonic bomber. Do we expect our bomber to be that much better, the Soviet air defense that much poorer, or the Soviets that much smarter in deciding that manned bombers are obsolete?

Sound defense decisions outside the procurement area are equally impossible until we acquire a better sense of policy direction. In the military assistance field, continuation of our military advisors in Latin America obviously preserves a degree of United States influence. But shouldn't we ask, on a country-by-country basis, whom we are influencing, toward what ends, and how this serves our national interest?

As a military matter, reversion of Okinawa to Japanese administrative control primarily involves the question of our unrestricted freedom to use it as a military base. But politically we should ask whether there may ever be circumstances in which we will want to use Okinawa for military operations which the Japanese are unwilling to support. In situations where the Japanese conclude that such use is not in their security interests, can it be essential to ours?

British withdrawal from East of Suez will leave a "great-power" vacuum in the Indian Ocean. Do we need bases and boats to fill it or can we count on nature's abhorrence, and the people of the area, to do that job? The considerations that led to British colonialism in the Nineteenth Century, when empire was profitable, can't justify an American military presence in this century if it means little more than a bigger defense bill. The White House and State Department assert that we will not replace the British. But unless we tell our military planners to forget it, we may find ourselves continuing to pay for that possibility.

The asserted unavailability of a "peace and growth dividend" will be a self-fulfilling prophecy if we use the peace to catch up on every item of our defense arsenal stinted by Vietnam priority needs. Before we can fit our defense program to our national interest, we must decide when and where we may seek to advance those interests by the application of military force. If our national security in fact demands a kind of Western Hemisphere "Brezhnev doctrine," we need the means to enforce a non-Communist orthodoxy. If we plan to support regimes in Southeast Asia against overthrow by their internal political rivals, we have to face up to the budgetary consequences. And if we must conclude that our security requires us to resist and repel external aggression wherever it appears in the world, then our present defense budget is indeed too little and too late.

But I doubt that these are the premises on which our foreign policy will proceed in practice. And I think that the theory underlying our defense budget should be consistent with what we plan in practice to do. This violates, I recognize, the principle of ambiguity in the conduct of foreign policy. There are admitted disadvantages in tipping off a hostile power as to the circumstances under which we may go to war. A degree of uncertainty is undeniably a valuable factor in deterring aggression. But the gray area should not be so large as to delude those who, if under attack, would have our best wishes but might expect our armed support. A coherent defense program can never be constructed if we continue to leave the architects confused about the purposes we want it to serve. ■

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# Memo of the Month

## Dear Old Golden Rule Days

Paul Junior High School
Washington, D.C.
September 9, 1969

DEAR PARENTS:

I want you to know that we here at Paul are deeply concerned about the safety of your children.

Several things have been done to assure us that every person in the building is given greater protection. They are as indicated below:

1. Self-locking doors with panic bars have been installed on all entrances.
2. All gates to the playground are locked at 9:30 A.M. so that entrance to the building can be gained through the main entrance only.
3. Increased staff surveillance of buildings and grounds.

We have further requested that the Juvenile Court handle criminal attacks as criminal attacks and not as the mere exuberance of youth.

We have also urged that the following measures be taken immediately:

By the Superintendent of Personnel:
1. Provide two additional custodians to monitor entrances.
2. Provide a night watchman.

By the Chief of Police:
1. Establish short beats in the immediate area (to include building and playground) of all schools.

By the Teachers:
1. Limit hall passes to the absolute minimum.
2. Inform students that the punishment for threats and/or violence is immediate suspension and possible expulsion or incarceration.
3. Inform students of the seriousness of jeopardizing building security by opening latched outside doors, the penalty for which is immediate suspension.

Very sincerely yours,

/s/ EDWARD ARMSTEAD, JR.
Principal



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# ANALYZING PRESIDENTS: From Passive-Positive Taft to Active-Negative Nixon

by James David Barber

The President is a lonely figure in a crowd of helpers: he must share the work; he cannot share the responsibility. He may try, as Harding did, to escape this tension by surrounding himself with advisors he can give in to; but if he does, he will find no way out when their counsel is divided. He may, as Wilson did, seek escape by turning inward, with a private declaration of independence; but if he does, he will risk mistake and failure in ventures where cooperation is imperative.

Now as before, the endless speculation about who has a President's confidence—and who is losing it or gaining it as issues shift—reflects a general recognition that the way a President defines and relates to his close circle of confidants influences policy significantly. Detailed studies of such relationships as Wilson with House, Franklin Roosevelt with Howe and Hopkins, and Eisenhower with Sherman Adams, tend to confirm this view.

How, then, might we go about predicting a President's strengths and weaknesses in his personal relations? I think a close examination of his *style*—the political habits he brings to the office—and his *character*—his basic orientation toward his own life—can reveal a good deal.

Through his style, a President relates himself to three main elements: the national audience (through rhetoric); his advisors, enemies, and subordinates (through personal relations); and the details of policy-making (through what I shall call decision management). In other words, Presidents have to make speeches, conduct negotiations, and solve problems. Each President distributes his energies differently among these tasks, and each shapes his style in a distinctive way. No President is born again on Inauguration Day. Like most people past middle age, a President tries to use his experience; he draws from what has worked for him before in coping with new work.

Where in a man's past are the best clues to his Presidential style? Strangely, they may not come from the way he has acted in immediately pre-Presidential roles. One thinks of Truman as Vice President, Kennedy as Senator, Hoover as Secretary of Commerce. As President, a man emerges as sole king of the mountain—suddenly on top all

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by himself, no longer one of the many climbing the ladder. His reactions are highly individualized; elements of his old Eriksonian identity crisis jump out of the past. He tends to hark back to that time when he had an analogous emergence—to his first independent political success, usually in early adulthood, when he developed a personal style that worked well for him.

Character has deeper and much less visible roots than style. But two gross dimensions outline the main types. First, divide the Presidents into the more active and the less active. Then cut across that with a division between those who seemed generally happy and optimistic and those who gave an impression of sadness and irritation. These crude clues tend to symptomize character packages. The "active-positive" type tends to show confidence, flexibility, and a focus on producing results through rational mastery. The "active-negative" tends to emphasize ambitious striving, aggressiveness, and a focus on the struggle for power against a hostile environment. "Passive-positive" types come through as receptive, compliant, other-directed persons whose superficial hopefulness masks much inner doubt. The "passive-negative" character tends to withdraw from conflict and uncertainty, to think in terms of vague principles of duty and regular procedure.

## William Howard Taft: Passive-Positive

Harris & Ewing

What lends drama to Presidential performances is the interplay of character and style. Consider William Howard Taft. In character, Taft was from the beginning a genial, agreeable, friendly, compliant person, much in need of affection from wife, family, and friends. He fits the passive-positive category most closely, with his slow-moving pace and his optimistic grin. Taft endured several illnesses and a severe accident during childhood. His family was remarkable for its close, affectionate relationships. I think he was spoiled. His father expected his children to do well in school, and Will did. By his Yale days he was a big, handsome campus favorite, with many friends but no really intimate ones. By his twenties he was a fat man. Always sensitive to criticism



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and anxious for approval, he repeatedly entered new offices with a feeling of personal inadequacy to the tasks before him. He was a humane friend of the men and women around him. His mother often said that "the love of approval was Will's besetting fault." As Secretary of War under Theodore Roosevelt, he won the President's approval by complying willingly with every assignment and by repeatedly expressing his devotion to him.

Taft's political style developed in his career as a lawyer and judge. By a series of family connections and historical accidents (Taft said he always had his plate turned right side up when offices were being handed out), he found his way into the judiciary and adopted the style of the legalist, the law-worshipper. He found the bench comfortable and secure, stable and safe, honorable and respected. He developed a decision-management style based firmly in a narrow, literal, conservative concept of a judge's relationship to the law. Principles were applied to cases to give verdicts, period.

The conflict between Taft's character and style was largely latent until after he became President in 1909. In the White House he had to choose between loyalty and law. His biographer, Henry F. Pringle, wrote that:

> Indeed, one of the astonishing things about Taft's four years in the White House was the almost total lack of men, related or otherwise, upon whom he could lean. He had no Cabot Lodge. He had no Colonel House. For the most part he faced his troubles alone.

Again there is the pattern of his earlier years: many friends, no intimates. And from his character came also his worshipful, submissive orientation toward Theodore Roosevelt, which he continued to express in letters and conversation as President. "I can never forget," he wrote to Roosevelt from the White House, "that the power that I now exercise was a voluntary transfer from you to me, and that I am under obligation to you to see to it that your judgment in selecting me as your successor and in bringing about the succession shall be vindicated according to the standards which you and I in conversation have always formulated."

Taft saw himself as a follower of TR—but not as an imitator of the TR style. "There is no use trying to be William Howard Taft with Roosevelt's ways," he wrote. Taft had learned, as a lawyer and judge, to manage decisions by the application of legal principles: "Our President has no initiative in respect to legislation given to him by law except that of mere recommendation, and no legal or formal method of entering into argument and discussion of the proposed legislation while pending in Congress," Taft said in a post-Presidential lecture in which he disagreed explicitly with Roosevelt's view that the "executive power was limited only by specific restrictions and prohibitions appearing in the Constitution." This was more than a matter of intellectual principle. Taft's judicial stance worked—as long as he was in judicial roles—to protect him from the fires of controversy. But in the White House, he abhorred the heat of the kitchen. As his Presidential aide wrote, "I have never known a man to dislike discord as much as the President. He wants every man's approval, and a row of any kind is repugnant to him."

President Taft had once told an aide that "if I only knew what the President [i.e., Roosevelt—for a long time Taft referred to TR this way] wanted...I would do it, but you know he has held himself so aloof that I am absolutely in the dark. I am deeply wounded." But Taft's character-rooted affectionate loyalty to Roosevelt inevitably came into conflict with Taft's legalistic style. The

*(Continued on page 38)*

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"I always think of the passengers as eggs."

**"Sometimes our radar indicates a little rough air ahead.
You know, the kind where you bounce a little. It has no effect on my control of the aircraft, but I'll still request clearance to get over it.
Even if it means losing some time.
Why?
When I started with American, 15 years ago, my first instructor told me something.
He said, 'Always think of the passengers as thin-shelled eggs sitting back there on the floor. And your job is to get them from point A to point B without putting the tiniest crack in one of them.'
I still take each bounce personally."**

Captain Cliff Schmidt is the kind of man who makes the best pilot because he's a concerned man. He does more than just his job. That's the American Way.

**Fly the American Way. American Airlines**

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(Continued from page 35)
initial issue was the Ballinger-Pinchot controversy over conservation policy. The details are not important here. What is significant to this discussion is that Taft attempted to solve a broad but intensely political conflict within his Administration through a strict application of the law. As he wrote of the controversy at the time: "I get very impatient at criticism by men who do not know what the law is, who have not looked it up, and yet ascribe all sorts of motives to those who live within it."

Slowly he began to see the Roosevelt Presidency as less than perfection, flawed by irregular procedures. He tried to find a way out which would not offend TR. But as criticisms from TR's followers mounted, negative references to Roosevelt crept into Taft's correspondence. The two managed to maintain a surface amiability in their meeting when Roosevelt returned from Africa, but as Roosevelt began making speeches, Taft found more and more cause for Constitutional alarm. When Roosevelt attacked property rights and then the Supreme Court, Taft became edgy and nervous. He lost his temper on the golf links. He began criticizing Roosevelt in less and less private circles. The man who had written in 1909 that "my coming into office was exactly as if Roosevelt had succeeded himself," wrote in 1912 of "facing as I do a crisis with Mr. Roosevelt."

The crisis came a piece at a time. In 1911, Taft still hoped to avoid a fight, though he saw Roosevelt as "so lacking in legal knowledge that his reasoning is just as deficient as Lodge's." Roosevelt continued to criticize. Taft stuck by his legal guns. However, he confided to his chief aide, Archie Butt: "It is hard, very hard, Archie, to see a devoted friendship going to pieces like a rope of sand."

By the end of 1911, it was clear that TR would not support Taft for re-election. As Pringle says of Taft's mood:

> He was heartsick and unhappy. "If I am defeated," he wrote, "I hope that somebody, sometime, will recognize the agony of spirit that I have undergone." Yet Taft remained in the contest. He fought to the limit of his too-tranquil nature because he envisioned the issue as more than a personal one. The "whole fate of constitutional government," he said, was at stake.

Roosevelt attacked "legalistic justice" as "a dead thing" and called on the people to "never forget that the judge is as much a servant of the people as any other official." At first Taft refrained from answering what he privately called TR's "lies and unblushing misrepresentations," but in April of 1912, confessing that "this wrenches my soul" and "I do not want to fight Theodore Roosevelt," he defended himself in public:

> Neither in thought nor word nor action have I been disloyal to the friendship I owe Theodore Roosevelt....I propose to examine the charges he makes against me, and to ask you whether in making them he is giving me a square deal.

Taft's nerves were shattered by the ordeal of attacking TR, that man "who so lightly regards constitutional principles, and especially the independence of the judiciary, one who is so naturally impatient of legal restraints, and of due legal procedure, and who has so misunderstood what liberty regulated by law is...." Exhausted, depressed and shaken, Taft was found by a reporter with his head in his hands. He looked up to say, "Roosevelt was my closest friend," and began to weep.

In 1912 the Republican party split apart and the Democrats captured the government.

The break between Taft and Roosevelt had numerous levels and dimensions; one of those was clearly the conflict within Taft between his legalistic style and his submissive character.


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Taft's decision-management approach—the application of principles to cases—served him well, both before and after he was President. It failed him as President. If he had had a different character, he might have pushed Roosevelt aside as soon as he won the Presidency, as Woodrow Wilson did the New Jersey bosses when he won his governorship. As it was, Taft nearly tore himself apart—and did help tear his party apart—by hanging onto his leader long after Roosevelt had, in Taft's eyes, broken the law.

## Harry S. Truman: Active-Positive

Harry S. Truman belongs among the active-positive Presidents. His activity is evident; beginning with a brisk walk early in the morning, he went at the job with all his might. And despite occasional discouragement, he relished his experience. His first memory was of his laughter while chasing a frog across the backyard; his grandmother said, "It's very strange that a two-year-old has such a sense of humor." When Democratic spirits hit the bottom in the 1948 campaign, Truman · said, "Everybody around here seems to be nervous but me." And he played the piano.

Although he was in his sixties throughout his long stay in the White House, he put in 16 to 18 hours a day at Presidenting, but "was fresher at the end than I was at the beginning," according to Charles Ross. Truman often got angry but rarely depressed. Once he compared the criticism he got with the "vicious slanders" against Washington, Lincoln, and Andrew Johnson. Truman expressed his bouyancy under attack in these words (quoted in William Hillman's *Mr. President*):

> So I don't let these things bother me for the simple reason that I know that I am trying to do the right thing and eventually the facts will come out. I'll probably be holding a conference with Saint Peter when that happens. I never give much weight or attention to the brickbats that are thrown my way. The people that cause me trouble are the good men who have to take these brickbats for me.

And then there is that ultimate, almost implausible indication of persistent optimism: he is said to have enjoyed being Vice President. The White House staff called him "Billie Spunk."

Truman had a strong father (nicknamed "Peanuts" for his short stature) and an affectionate mother. The family had more than its share of difficulties, especially financial ones. They moved several times in Harry's early years. His severe vision problem kept him out of school until he was eight, and at nine he nearly died of diphtheria. But he appears to have come through it with an unusually strong store of self-confidence, ready to endure what had to be, ready to reach out when opportunities presented themselves. He drew on a home in which the rules said: Do the right thing, Love one another, and By their fruits shall ye know them. When he telephoned his mother to ask if she had listened to his inauguration as Vice President on the radio, she answered: "Yes. I heard it all. Now you behave yourself up there, Harry. You behave yourself!"

Truman's drive for decisions, his emphasis on results, his faith in rational persuasion, his confidence in his own values, his humor about himself, and his ability to grow into responsibility all fit the active-positive character. The character shows itself as an orientation, a broad direction of energy and affect, a tendency to experience self

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and others in a certain way. Truman attacked life; he was not withdrawn. He emphasized his independence; he was not compliant. He laughed at himself; he was not compulsive (though he showed some tendencies in that direction). His character thus provided a foundation for the transcendence of his defenses, for devoting his attention to the realities beyond himself.

Style is what he built on those foundations. Truman's style developed in two main spurts. "So far as its effect on Harry Truman was concerned," his biographer writes, "World War I released the genie from the bottle." He had worked in a bank, farmed, taken a flier on an oil-drilling enterprise, joined the Masons, and fallen in love with Bess Wallace. The family was having financial difficulties again. His father died in 1914, when Harry was 30. At the outbreak of the war, he joined the National Guard and was elected lieutenant by his friends. Sent away from home to Oklahoma, he became regimental canteen officer, with Eddie Jacobson as his assistant. The other Ft. Sill canteens had heavy losses, but the Truman-Jacobson enterprise returned 666 per cent on the initial investment in six months. In charge for the first time, Truman had shown that he could succeed through careful management. Later in France, he was put in charge of a rowdy flock of Irish pranksters loosely organized as a field-artillery battery. One former officer who could not control the men had been thrown out of the Army; another had broken down under the strain. Upon assuming command, Truman recalled later, "I was the most thoroughly scared individual in that camp. Never on the front or anywhere else have I been so nervous." Alfred Steinberg, in *The Man from Missouri*, gives this account of how Truman handled himself:

> "Men," he told the sergeants and corporals, "I know you've been making trouble for your previous commanders. From now on, you're going to be responsible for maintaining discipline in your squads and sections. And if there are any of you who can't, speak up right now and I'll bust you back right now."

Truman did his own reconnaissance at the front, to get his information firsthand. When his troops broke and ran under fire in "The Battle of Who Run":

> "I got up and called them everything I knew," said Truman. The curses that poured out contained some of the vilest four-letter words heard on the Western Front. Said Father Curtis Tiernan, the regiment's Catholic chaplain, who was on the scene, "It took the skin off the ears of those boys." The effect was amazing, Padre Tiernan recalled with pleasure. "It turned those boys right around."

"Captain Harry" came out of the war with the respect and admiration of his



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men. He had learned that his angry voice could turn the tide and that he could decide what to do if he got the facts himself and paid attention to the details. Most important, his style developed around intense loyalty in personal relations: everything depended on the stick-togetherness of imperfect allies.

After the war, Truman and Jacobson opened their famous haberdashery, serving mostly old Army buddies. An Army friend who happened to be a Missouri Pendergast got him into politics—not against his will. He ran for county judge and won; his performance in that office reconfirmed his faith in hard personal campaigning and in careful, honest business practice. During the campaign he was charged with voting for a member of the other party and he answered with this speech:

> You have heard it said that I voted for John Miles for county marshal. I'll have to plead guilty to that charge, along with 5,000 ex-soldiers. I was closer to John Miles than a brother. I have seen him in places that made hell look like a playground. I have seen him stick to his guns when Frenchmen were falling back. I have seen him hold the American line when only John Miles and his three batteries were between the Germans and a successful counterattack. He was of the right stuff, and a man who wouldn't vote for his comrade under circumstances such as these would be untrue to his country. I know that every soldier understands it. I have no apology to make for it.

These experiences reinforced and confirmed an emphasis Truman had grown up with. "If Mamma Truman was for you," he said, "she was for you, and as long as she lived I always knew there was one person who was in my corner." Throughout his political life Truman reiterated this for-me-or-against-me theme:

> "We don't play halfway politics in Missouri. When we start out with a man, if he is any good at all, we always stay with him to the end. Sometimes people quit me but I never quit people when I start to back them up."

> [To Admiral Leahy:] "Of course, I will make the decisions, and after a decision is made, I will expect you to be loyal."

> [Margaret Truman, on her father's philosophy:] "...'the friends thou hast and their adoption tried, grapple them to thy soul with hoops of steel'...."

> [From Truman's own memoirs:] "Vinson was gifted with a sense of personal and political loyalty seldom found among the top men in Washington. Too often loyalties are breached in Washington in the rivalries for political advantage."

> [Truman on Tom Pendergast:] "I never deserted him when he needed friends. Many for whom he'd done much more than he ever did for me ran out on him when the going was rough. I didn't do that—and I am President of the United States in my own right!"

> [Truman to Harry Vaughn:] "Harry, they're just trying to use you to embarrass me. You go up there, and tell 'em to go to hell. We came in here together and, God damn it, we're going out together!"

> [Of Eisenhower's refusal to stand up for Marshall:] "You don't kick the man who made you."

What did this emphasis on loyalty mean for the Truman Presidency? The story of Truman's wrangles with aides high and low is well known. Conflicts, misunderstandings, scandals, and dismissals piled up: Byrnes, Wallace, Ickes, Louis Johnson, J. Howard McGrath, Morgenthau, MacArthur, Baruch, Clifford vs. Steelman, and the ragtag crew of cronies and influenceables typified by Harry Vaughan. The landscape of

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the Truman administration was littered with political corpses. Both Presidential candidates in 1952 promised to clean up what Eisenhower called "the mess in Washington."

I think Patrick Anderson, in *The President's Men,* is right when he sees the key to Truman's loyalty troubles "in the man himself, not in those who so poorly served him." Anderson continues:

> Truman once said that his entire political career was based upon his World War I experience, upon the friends he made and the lessons he learned. It was as an army captain under fire in France that Harry Truman first learned that he was as brave and as capable as the next man. He learned, too, the rule that says an officer must always stand by his men. Perhaps he learned that rule too well; in later years he seemed to confuse standing by Harry Vaughan when he was under fire from Drew Pearson with standing by the men of the 35th Division when they were under fire from the Germans at Meuse-Argonne and Verdun.
>
> After the war, he was a failure as a businessman; his success came in politics. It must have galled Truman that he owed his political success to the corruption-ridden Pendergast machine. But he kept quiet, he kept his hands clean, he learned to mind his own business. That may be another lesson he learned too well. The most simple, most harsh explanation of Truman's tolerance is just this: You can take the politician out of the county courthouse, but you can't take the county courthouse out of the politician.
>
> But it is not that simple. Another reason Truman stood by Vaughan and the others was no doubt simple political tactics: If you fire a man, you in effect admit wrongdoing; if you keep him, you can continue to deny it. More than by politics, however, Truman seems to have been motivated by stubborn loyalty to his friends. It was a sadly misguided loyalty, for Presidents owe a loyalty to the nation that transcends any allegiance to erring friends. Roosevelt understood this instinctively; Truman would not recognize it. Truman's dilemma was complicated by the fact that his nature was more sentimental than that of any of the other recent Presidents. It is often helpful for a President to be a ruthless son-of-a-bitch, particularly in his personal relationships; this, for better or worse, Truman was not.

There appears to have been a lapse in communication in each of Truman's "breaks" with such high-level personages as Wallace, Byrnes, Baruch, and MacArthur. Truman believed that he had made clear to the other fellow just how he must change his behavior; each of the others believed that Truman had endorsed him in the course he was pursuing. Truman seems to have been slowly, and then radically, disillusioned with men in whom he had placed his trust. He was not able to realize that the loyalties around a President are not black and white—as they are in battle or in a Missouri political campaign—but rather shade off from Vaughan-like sycophancy at one end of the spectrum to MacArthur-like independence at the other. For Truman, loyalties were hard and brittle; when they broke they broke. Before he became President, he had, after all, been the chief of loyal subordinates only twice: in the Army and as a "judge" in Missouri. It was natural for him to revert back to those times when he was again in charge.

In terms of our character and style analysis, Truman shows one form of danger inherent in the political adaptation of the active-positive type. To oversimplify what is really much more complicated: the character who has overcome his own hang-ups, who has leaped over the barriers between himself and the real world, whose bent is toward rational mastery of the environment, is likely to forget, from time to time, that other persons, publics, and insti-



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tutions maintain themselves in rather messier ways. In another context I have said this type may want a political institution "to deliberate like Plato's Academy and then take action like Caesar's army," neglecting the necessities of emotional inspiration and peaceful procedure. The type is also vulnerable to betrayal when he assumes that others who seem to share his purposes will see those purposes precisely as he does and govern their actions accordingly. He is especially prone to this mistake with respect to the active-negative type who is, on the surface, like him in many ways.

Truman's style exaggerated these characteristic vulnerabilities. What he had learned of himself when he was under 20 was shaped and channeled by what he learned of life when he was over 30. Character fed style, style digested character. Amid many Presidential successes, most of his failures can be traced to a particular way in which style reinforced character trends.

## Dwight D. Eisenhower: Passive-Negative

Eisenhower as President is best approximated in the passive-negative category, in which tendencies to withdraw predominate. On a great many occasions in the biographies, Eisenhower is found asserting himself by denying himself; that is, by taking a strong stand against the suggestion that he take a strong stand.

No, he would not get down in the gutter with Joseph McCarthy; no, he would not stop the Cohn and Schine highjinks. Franklin Roosevelt had usurped Congressional powers, he thought, and he would not do that: "I want to say with all the emphasis at my command that this Administration has absolutely *no* personal choice for a new Majority Leader. *We* are not going to get into *their* business." When "those damn monkeys on the Hill" acted up, he would stay out of it. Press conferences were another Rooseveltian mistake: "I keep telling you fellows I don't like to do this sort of thing." Was he under attack in the press? "Listen," Eisenhower said, "anyone who has time to listen to commentators or read columnists obviously doesn't have enough work to do." Should he engage in personal summitry on the international front? "This idea of the President of the United States going personally abroad to negotiate—it's just damn stupid."

With a new Cabinet, wouldn't it make sense to oversee them rather carefully? "I guess you know about as much about the job as I do," he told George Humphrey. His friend Arthur Larson wrote that Eisenhower found patronage "nauseating" and "partisan political effect was not only at the bottom of the list—indeed, it did not exist as a motive at all." In 1958 the President said, "Frankly, I don't care too much about the Congressional elections." Eisenhower disliked speechmaking (he had once been struck by lightning while delivering a lecture). Urged to address some meeting, he would typically say, "Well, all right, but not over 20 minutes." Sherman Adams writes that Eisenhower "focused his mind completely on the big and important aspects of the questions we discussed, shutting out with a strongly self-disciplined firmness the smaller and petty side issues when they crept into the conversation." In other words, he did not so much select problems upon which to concentrate as he selected an *aspect* of all problems—the aspect of principle.

When someone aggravated Eisen-

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

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hower, he would "write his name on a piece of paper, put it in my lower desk drawer, and shut the drawer." When it came time to end his four-pack-a-day cigarette habit, "I found that the easiest way was just to put it out of your mind."

Eisenhower's tendency to move away from involvements, to avoid personal commitments, was supported by belief: "My personal convictions, no matter how strong, cannot be the final answer," he said. The definition of democracy he liked best was "simply the opportunity for self-discipline." As a military man he had detested and avoided politics at least since his first command, when a Congressman had pressed him for a favor. His beliefs were carved into epigrams:

He that conquereth his own soul is greater than he who taketh a city.

Forget yourself and personal fortunes.

Belligerence is the hallmark of insecurity.

Never lose your temper except intentionally.

It is the tone, the flavor, the aura of self-denial and refusal that counts in these comments. Eisenhower is not attacking or rejecting others; he is simply turning away from them, leaving them alone, refusing to interfere.

His character is further illuminated by his complaints, which cluster around the theme of being bothered. His temper flared whenever he felt that he was either being imposed upon or interfered with on matters he wanted others to handle. He "heatedly gave the Cabinet to understand that he was sick and tired of being bothered about patronage." "When does anybody get any time to think around here?" he complained to Adams. Robert Donovan said of Eisenhower: "Nothing gets him out of sorts faster than for a subordinate to come in and start to hem and haw about a decision. He wants the decision and not



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the thinking out loud." Eisenhower felt that his 1955 heart attack was triggered when he was repeatedly interrupted on the golf links by unnecessary phone calls from the State Department. In 1948, when he finally managed to stop the boomlet for his nomination, he said he felt "as if I've had an abscessed tooth pulled." He told a persistent reporter as the 1948 speculations continued: "Look, son, I cannot conceive of any circumstance that could drag out of me permission to consider me for any political post from dogcatcher to Grand High Supreme King of the Universe."

Why, then, did Eisenhower bother to become President? Why did he answer those phone calls on the golf links? Because he thought he ought to. He was a sucker for duty and always had been. Sentiments which would sound false for most political leaders ring true for Eisenhower:

> My only satisfaction in life is to hope that my effort means something to the other fellow. What can I do to repay society for the wonderful opportunities it has given me?
>
> ...a decision that I have never recanted or regretted [was the decision] to perform every duty given me in the Army to the best of my ability and to do the best I could to make a creditable record, no matter what the nature of the duty.
>
> ...in trying to explain to you a situation that has been tossed in my teeth more than once (my lack of extended troop duty in recent years), all I accomplished was to pass up something I *wanted* to do, in favor of something I thought I *ought* to do.

He did not feel a duty to save the world or to become a great hero, but simply to contribute what he could, in the best way he was able. From the family Bible readings, from the sportsmanship of a boy who wanted nothing more than to be a first-rate athlete, from the West Point creed, Eisenhower felt, amid questions about many other things, that duty was a certainty.

In all these respects, and also in his personal comradeliness, Eisenhower fits the passive-negative (or "reluctant") type. The orientation is toward performing duty with modesty; the political adaptation is characterized by protective retreats to principle, ritual, and personal virtue. The political strength of this character is its legitimacy. It inspires trust in the incorruptibility and the good intentions of the man. Its political weakness is its inability to produce, though it may contribute by preventing. Typically, the passive-negative character presides over drift and confusion, partially concealed by the apparent orderliness of the formalities. Samuel Lubell caught the crux of this character when he saw in Eisenhower "one man's struggle between a passion for active duty and a dream of quiet retirement."

Eisenhower's political style, particularly his style in personal relations, channeled these character forces in an interesting way. At West Point he was a minor hellraiser (eventually ranking 125th in a class of 164 in "conduct") and a dedicated athlete until an injury, incurred because he would not tell a sadistic riding instructor that he had a weak knee, removed him from competition. He missed combat in World War I and kicked around for a good many years in staff jobs and football coaching; he served seven years on the staff of that flamboyant self-dramatist, Douglas MacArthur, for whom Eisenhower learned to make a newly-developing kind of military administration work.

The old structure of military command—the hierarchy—was giving way to a system less like a pyramid, more like a floating crap game, a system of interdependent functional specialties—teams—that had to be brought together

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around new technological and strategic concepts. Eisenhower mastered the skills this system increasingly demanded, particularly the ability to coordinate, to gather together the right threads into the right knot. It was *this* style, the style of the modern administrative team-coordinator, that stuck with Eisenhower on into his White House years. The danger of his "military mind" was not that he would be a martinet, a MacArthur; here Harry Truman misestimated him. It was Eisenhower's command habit of central coordination that shaped his behavior. The President, he said,

> must know the general purpose of everything that is going on, the general problem that is there, whether or not it is being solved or the solution is going ahead according to principles in which he believes and which he has promulgated; and, finally, he must say "yes" or "no."

The well-known staff system Eisenhower put into the Presidency was designed to leave him free to coordinate at the highest level. The trouble was that the level got higher and higher, more and more removed from the political battlefield, until, in his second term, Eisenhower had to break through a good many layers and circles to get at the controls of policy.

In the Army, Eisenhower's brand of coordination went forward in a context of command; the colonels were dependent on the generals. An order announced (after however much coordination) was an order to be executed. Not so in politics, where promulgation is just the beginning. In an Army at war, coordination takes place behind the advancing flag: the overriding purposes are not in question. Not so in the political "order" where the national purpose is continually questioned and redefined.

When Eisenhower had to deal with military matters as President, such as Lebanon and the Suez crisis, he could act with celerity and precision. He took his greatest pride in the fact that there had been eight years of peace during his administration. But at the same time his character and style fit together to contribute—along with many external factors—to a long list of less happy incidents and trends (Dixon-Yates, Dullesian brinksmanship, the Faubus and U-2 bumbles, the McCarthy contagion). He didn't mean it this way, but when Eisenhower said that "our system demands the Supreme Being," he was probably right.

## Lyndon B. Johnson: Active-Negative

For this generation of President-watchers, it would be tedious to document President Lyndon B. Johnson's difficulties in personal relations. The bully-ragging, the humiliations visited upon the men around him, are nearly as familiar as his rages against the Kennedy clan. By mid-1966 it was hard to find an independent voice among his intimate advisors. What had happened to a political style whose cornerstone was the expert manipulation of personal relations?

Johnson experienced his first independent political success as a student at Southwest Texas State Teachers College. Lyndon's mother pushed the boy to get an education; when he was four years old she persuaded the local schoolteacher to let him attend classes. In 1924, he graduated from high school at 15, the youngest of the six-member senior class as well as its president.



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That year he had lost an important debating contest ("I was so disappointed I went right into the bathroom and was sick"). The year before the family had moved back to a farm in Johnson City and stayed "just long enough for Daddy to go broke," Lyndon's sister recalled.

After high school, Lyndon told all his friends he was through with school forever, despite his mother's urgings to go on. That summer he tried a clerical job for a few weeks but got discouraged and came home. Then Lyndon and two friends left home for California in an old car. A year and a half later, thin, broke, and hungry, he came back and found a job on a road gang for a dollar a day. There was some beer and girls and fights; once his mother looked at his bloodied face and said, "To think that my eldest-born should turn out like this." By February, 1927, Lyndon had had enough: "I'm sick of working with just my hands, and I'm ready to try working with my brain. If you and Daddy can get me into a college, I'll go as soon as I can." On borrowed money, he set off for San Marcos.

Johnson's intense ambition—and his style in personal relations, rhetoric, and decision management—took shape in his college years. The academic side of life did not trouble him much at unaccredited Southwest Texas Teachers; he attacked his courses "with an intensity he had never before revealed." But his main energies went into operating, getting on top of the institution. President Evans got him a job collecting trash, but Lyndon soon cajoled his way into a position as assistant to the President's secretary, with a desk in the outer office. In *Sam Johnson's Boy*, Alfred Steinberg continues the story:

> According to Nichols [the secretary], what next unfolded was flabbergasting. Lyndon jumped up to talk to everyone who came to the office to see Evans, and before days passed, he was asking the purpose of the visit and offering solutions to problems. The notion soon spread that it was necessary to get Lyndon's approval first in order to see Dr. Evans. At the same time, faculty members came to the conclusion that it was essential for them to be friendly to Lyndon, for they believed he could influence the president on their behalf. This erroneous idea developed because the school lacked a telephone system tying President Evans' office with those of department heads, and when the president wanted to send a message to a department head or a professor, he asked his part-time aide, rather than Nichols, to run over with a note. Lyndon's tone and attitude somehow gave the impression he was far more than a messenger.

Soon this student assistant was slapping the president on the back, accompanying him to the state capitol, answering mail, and writing reports to state agencies. "Lyndon," President Evans said, "I declare you hadn't been in my office a month before I could hardly tell who was president of the school—you or me."

Johnson was off and running. Blackballed by the dominant fraternity, he helped start a rival one, the White Stars, who won campus elections in part by Johnson's energetic behind-the-scenes campaigning and in part by fancy parliamentary tactics. Johnson sold more Real Silk socks than his customers had use for. He became a star debater, significantly in a system where he and his partner had to prepare both sides of each question because the assignment of negative or affirmative turned on the flip of a coin just before the debate. Johnson's strength was in finding the opponents' key weakness, and then exploiting it to the hilt. Later he began to win office: president of the press club, senior legislator of his class, student council member, secretary of the Schoolmakers Club, editor of the newspaper. His editorials were full of positive think-



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ing. They came out for courtesy, "honesty of soul," and the Fourth of July, along with some more personal sentiments:

> Personality is power; the man with a striking personality can accomplish greater deeds in life than a man of equal abilities but less personality.
>
> The great men of the world are those who have never faltered. They had the glowing vision of a noble work to inspire them to press forward, but they also had the inflexible will, the resolute determination, the perfectly attuned spiritual forces for the execution of the work planned.
>
> The successful man has a well-trained will. He has under absolute control his passions and desires, his habits and his deeds.
>
> There are no tyrannies like those that human passions and weaknesses exercise. No master is so cruelly exacting as an indulged appetite. To govern self is a greater feat than to control armies and forces.
>
> Ambition is an uncomfortable companion many times. He creates discontent with present surroundings and achievements; he is never satisfied but always pressing forward to better things in the future. Restless, energetic, purposeful, it is ambition that makes of a creature a real man.

In 1928, Johnson left college with a two-year teaching certificate. He returned a year later after having served, at the age of 20, as principal of an elementary school in Cotulla, Texas. As principal (over five teachers and a janitor), Lyndon was in his first chief executive position. His friendly biographers report he was "a firm administrator, a strict disciplinarian, and a good teacher." He insisted that Mexican children speak only English, and he required his teachers to keep constant supervision of the students. Laziness or misbehavior "was likely to bring some form of punishment. A hard worker himself, Johnson expected others to work with equal energy and determination. He was persistent, sometimes high-tempered, energetic, aggressive, and creative." His march into the classroom each morning was the signal for the students to sing out:

> How do you do, Mr. Johnson,
> How do you do?
> How do you do, Mr. Johnson,
> How are you?
> We'll do it if we can,
> We'll stand by you to a man.
> How do you do, Mr. Johnson,
> How are you?

Mr. Johnson spanked at least one boy who ridiculed his walk. His energy was incredible. He introduced school assemblies, inter-school public-speaking contests, spelldowns, baseball games, track meets, parental car pools for transporting children, coached debating and basketball at the high school, organized a literary society, courted a girl who taught 35 miles away, and took courses at the Cotulla extension center.

Enough. Johnson's style—the whirlwind energy, the operator-dominator personal relations, the idealistic rhetoric, the use of information as an instrument—all of it was there when he emerged from road-gang bum to big wheel in the world of San Marcos and Cotulla. Obviously personal relations was at the core of his style. It displayed itself in two interesting variations: Johnson on the make, and Johnson in charge. In the first he was the operator who repeated, as secretary to a conservative Congressman and as Senate party leader, the story of his San Marcos takeover, showing a remarkable ability to expand his roles—and his influence— through energetic social manipulation. Johnson in charge used domination successfully, forcing subordinates into conformity.



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

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I think Johnson's character infused this stylistic pattern with a compulsive quality, so that he was virtually unable to alter it when it proved unproductive. Clearly Johnson belongs among the active-negative characters. His fantastic pace of action in the Presidency was obvious. He was also characteristically discouraged much of the time. On the wall of his Senate office he hung this quotation from Edmund Burke:

> Those who would carry on great public schemes must be proof against the worst fatiguing delays, the most mortifying disappointments, the most shocking insults, and worst of all, the presumptuous judgment of the ignorant upon their designs.

He was, he said, "the loneliest man in the world," "the most denounced man in the world," for whom "nothing really seems to go right from early in the morning until late at night," who was "not sure whether I can lead this country and keep it together, with my background." Even at the height of his success—at the close of the remarkable first session of the 89th Congress—Johnson, convalescing from a gallstone operation, complained:

> What do they want—what *really* do they want? I am giving them boom times and more good legislation than anybody else did, and what do they do—attack and sneer! Could FDR do better? Could anybody do better? What *do* they want?

Johnson's remarkable effectiveness *in situations where the social environment provided direction* is not to be doubted. As Senate Democratic Leader he reached the high point of success in consensus-building by catching issues at the right stage of development, mapping the terrain of Senatorial opinion, and manipulating members' perceptions and expectations to get bills passed. The raw materials were given: Johnson did not take a stand, he worked with the range of stands he found among other members, pushing here, pulling there, until he had a workable configuration of votes. "I have always thought of myself as one who has been moderate in approaching problems," he said. But "moderation"—like Eisenhower's middle-of-the-road— is a relational concept definable only in terms of the positions others take. In the legislative setting, Johnson *had* to work that way. In the Presidency, Johnson had around him, not a circle of Senatorial barons, each with his own independence and authority, but a circle of subordinates. There his beseeching for knowledge of "what they *really* want," his feeling that "no President ever had a problem of doing what is right; the big problem is knowing what is right," and especially his plea to his advisors that "all you fellows must be prudent about what you encourage me to go for," indicated the disorientation of an expert middleman elevated above the ordinary political marketplace.

Put crudely: Johnson's style failed him, so he fell back on character. There

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he found no clear-cut ideology, no particular direction other than the compulsion to secure and enhance his personal power. As his real troubles mounted, he compounded them by so dominating his advisors that he was eventually left even more alone, even more vulnerable to the exaggerations of his inner dramas, until he took to wondering aloud: "Why don't people like me?" "Why do you want to destroy me?" "I can't trust anybody!" "What are you trying to do to me? Everybody is trying to cut me down, destroy me!"

## Richard Nixon: Active-Negative

The description accompanying Richard Nixon's figure at the Fisherman's Wharf Wax Museum in San Francisco calls the President "industrious and persistent," "ambitious and dedicated from childhood." Like Woodrow Wilson, Herbert Hoover, and Lyndon B. Johnson, Nixon in the early months of his Presidency seemed happy in his work.

He began cautiously. Recognizing the national mood as calling for peace and quiet, empowered by a narrow, minority victory in the election, and confronting a Congress and a bureaucracy dominated by Democrats, he opted for an undramatic beginning. He devoted much of his attention in these early days to gathering around him the men who would help him shape a program, and in arranging them in relation to his own style of operation.

The recruitment process had its difficulties—Nixon received refusals from his first choices for Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury and Attorney General; his friend Finch had decided not to accept the Vice Presidential nomination; Warren Burger was at least fifth on his list of candidates for Chief Justice. But it was probably Nixon's own preference which brought together in the Cabinet a collection of competent, quiet, relatively obscure men whose "extra dimensions" he had to describe to the unknowing national audience, and in the White House a crew of younger lieutenant-colonel types leavened with two brilliant Harvardians. He intended to disperse power in his administration. In 1968 he had said: "Publicity would not center at the White House alone. Every key official would have the opportunity to be a big man in his field." If so, their reputations would be made, largely, within and through the Nixon Administration.

Nixon's Presidential style was not entirely clear as of September, 1969; he had not yet been through the fires of large-scale political crisis. But a few features emerged that seemed likely to persist. In several ways, Nixon appeared to have adopted a judge-like stance:

- He takes up one case at a time and tries to dispose of it before moving on to the next case.
- He relies on formal, official channels for information and advice. In his ABM decision, for example, "Although he instructed his aides to seek out all sides of the argument, the President appears to have had little direct contact with opponents or advocates of the missile system outside his own circle." Senators and scientists opposed to the ABM sought out Kissinger, who prepared a "devil's advocate" paper.
- At official meetings, Nixon is the presider, the listener who keeps his own counsel while other members of the group present their cases and options and briefs, like lawyers in a court. He asks questions; he himself rarely tosses out suggestions for critical comment.



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• Evidence in hand, he retires to his chambers (usually a small room off the Lincoln bedroom), where he may spend hours in complete solitude reaching his decision.

• He emerges and pronounces the verdict.

By September, this system had already produced some Presidential stumbles. Decisions or near-decisions taken in this fashion had to be reversed or abruptly modified as they set off political alarms. There was the $30,000 job for Nixon's brother Edward; Franklin Long and the National Science Foundation directorship; Willie Mae Rogers's appointment as consumer consultant; the Knowles appointment; the nomination and then withdrawal of Peter Bove to be Governor of the Virgin Islands; the shelving and then unshelving of the "hunger" question; the backing and filling regarding desegregation guidelines; and the various changes in the Job Corps. In these cases "decisions" came unglued in the face of indignant and surprised reactions from the press, interest groups, and Congress. The resignation of Clifford Alexander and the appointment of Senator Strom Thurmond's protégé as chief White House political troubleshooter seemed to indicate inadequate consultation, as did certain exaggerations by Secretary Laird on defense and Attorney General Mitchell on "preventive detention." On the ABM, Nixon emerged, despite his victory, with about half the Senate confirmed in opposition. These bobbles may be seen, some years hence, as nothing more than the inevitable trials of shaking down a new crew. Through them all, Nixon's popularity with the public rose.

It is the isolation, the lonely seclusion adopted consciously as a way of deciding, that stands out in Nixon's personal-relations style. That style was defined, in its main configurations, at the time of his first independent political success in 1946.

Following a childhood marred by accident, severe illness, the deaths of two brothers, and much family financial insecurity, Richard Nixon made his way to the Law School of Duke University, where he succeeded as a student but failed in his fervent desire to land a position in New York or Washington upon his graduation in 1937. Instead, his mother arranged a place for him in a small Whittier firm, where he spent the late 1930's in a practice featuring a good deal of divorce and criminal law, holding town attorney office, and serving as a trustee of Whittier College. He and "a group of local plungers" gambled $10,000 to start a frozen-orange-juice company which went broke after a year and a half. In 1938, he proposed to Pat Ryan the night they met; they were married in May of 1940 and took an apartment over a garage.

After Pearl Harbor he worked briefly in the OPA tire-rationing office in Washington before entering the Navy as a lieutenant junior grade—at which, Nixon remembered in 1968, his "gentle, Quaker mother...quietly wept." He met William P. Rogers in the Navy. He served as a supply officer in the South Pacific, where he ran a kind of commissary, called "Nixon's Hamburger Stand." When he returned from the war, he struck acquaintances as unusually contemplative, "dreaming about some new world order," possibly feeling guilty about his "'sin' of serving in the armed forces." Then there was an unexpected outburst: at a homecoming luncheon for some 30 family and friends, an elderly cousin gave an arm-chair analysis of the war. Suddenly Richard leaned across the table and cursed the old man out. Talk stopped. His folks were amazed. Nixon thought no one there would ever forget this uncharacteristic outburst.

He was returning to be, in his own words, "Nothing...a small-time lawyer just out of the Navy." Then, as he was



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winding up his service in Baltimore, he received a call from a Whittier banker asking if he would run for Congress against Jerry Voorhis. He accepted almost immediately. The year was 1945; Nixon was 32. He flew back to California and appeared in his uniform before the Republican group; he brought along a collection of pictures he had had taken, in his lieutenant commander's uniform, for use in the campaign. He impressed the group with his calm, crisp answers. They took him as their candidate in what seemed like a hopeless campaign against the popular Voorhis. In his letter of acceptance he said he planned to stress "a group of speeches." Voorhis's "conservative reputation must be blasted," he said. His campaign became an aggressive rhetorical performance in which he won with little help from anyone else.

Nixon's success at this period was independent of his family; it was his first clearly political commitment in a personal sense; it was then, he wrote later, that "the meaning of crisis [took] on sharply expanded dimensions"—a fine paraphrase of Alexander George's concept of the expansion of one's "field of power." Perhaps most important is the independence dimension: he had tried several times to make it into the big time in a big city away from home and now he had achieved that.

The shape of Nixon's style, confirmed in his subsequent success with the Hiss case, was clear in its general outline at this point. Close inter-personal relations were simply not very important to his success. He was, and remained, a loner. His style was centered in speaking and in hard work getting ready to speak. Later he attributed his victory over Voorhis to three factors: "intensive campaigning; doing my homework; and participating in debates with my better-known opponent." From then on, Nixon was primarily a man on his own—a hard-working, careful student of one issue or case at a time, continually preparing for a public presentation, highly sensitive to his rhetorical style and the reactions of audiences to him. Throughout his career, including his stint with Eisenhower, Nixon was never a full-fledged member of a cooperative team or an administrator used to overseeing the work of such a team. He stood apart, made his own judgments, relied on his own decisions.

All this should have made it evident that Nixon in the Presidency would (a) develop a rhetorical stance carefully attuned to his reading of the temper of the times (and of the public's reaction to him), (b) work very hard at building a detailed case to back up each of his positions, and (c) maintain a stance of interpersonal independence and individual final authority with respect to his Cabinet and his White House staff.

It is the way this style interacts with Nixon's character which is of interest here. Despite his current air of happy calm, similar in many ways to the early Presidential experience of others of his type, Nixon belongs, I think, among the active-negative President. On the activity side there is little doubt. Nixon has always been a striver, an energetic doer who attacks his tasks vigorously and aggressively. He has often driven himself to gray-faced exhaustion. But even the less demanding 1968-69 Nixon schedules leave him on the side of activists, in contrast, to, say, Taft, Harding, Coolidge, and Eisenhower.

As for his affect toward his experience, I would put more stock in the way he has typically felt about what he was doing over a lifetime than I would put in his current euphoria. Over more than 20 political years, Nixon has seen himself repeatedly as being just on the verge of quitting. Furthermore, on many occasions he has experienced profound



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depression and disappointment, even when he was succeeding. As a new Congressman, he said he had "the same lost feeling I had when I went into military service." With the Hiss case victory, "I should have felt elated.... However, I experienced a sense of letdown which is difficult to describe or even to understand." Running for the Senate in 1950 he was a "sad but earnest underdog." The Nixon Fund episode in 1952 left him "gloomy and angry;" after the Checkers speech, he said, "I loused it up, and I am sorry.... It was a flop," and then he cried. He was "dissatisfied" and "disappointed" in his Vice Presidency; in "semi-shock" at Eisenhower's heart attack; he found the President's 1956 hesitations about him "an emotional ordeal;" he was "grim and nervous" in 1960, and he exploded bitterly and publicly after his 1962 defeat.

There have been a few piano-thumping exceptions, but the general tone of Nixon in politics—even when he has not been in a crisis—has been the doing of the unpleasant but necessary. It is this lifelong sense that the burdens outweigh the pleasures which must be set up against the prospect of a new Nixon continuing to find the White House a fun place. In the introduction to *Six Crises*, Nixon writes, "I find it especially difficult to answer the question, does a man 'enjoy' crises?" He goes on to say that he had not found his "fun," but that "surely there is more to life than the search for enjoyment in the popular sense." Crisis engages all a man's talents; he loses himself in a larger cause. Nixon contrasts enjoyment with "life's mountaintop experiences"—what he calls the "exquisite agony" of crisis. When Nixon begins to feel pleasantly relaxed, or playfully enjoying, I think, some danger sign goes up, some inner commandment says no, and he feels called back into the quest for worlds to conquer.

There are many more aspects of Nixon's character that fit the active-negative type: the unclear and discontinuous self-image; the continual self-examination and effort to construct a "Richard Nixon;" the fatalism and pessimism; the substitution of technique for value; the energies devoted to controlling aggressive feelings; the distrust of political allies; and, most of all, the perpetual sensitivity to the power dimensions of situations. I think that if Nixon is ever threatened simultaneously with public disdain and loss of power, he may move into a crisis syndrome. In that case, the important resonances will be direct ones between character and the political environment; style would play a secondary part. But in the ordinary conduct of the Presidency (and there are long stretches of that), Nixon's personal-relations style may interact with his character to produce a different kind of danger, a kind the Presi-

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dent and his friends could, I think, steer away from.

The danger is that Nixon will commit himself irrevocably to some disastrous course of action, as, indeed, his predecessor did. This is precisely the possibility against which Nixon could defend himself by a stylistic adjustment in his relations with his White House friends. Yet it is made more likely than it need be by the way he appears to be designing his decision-making process in the critical early period of definition.

It may seem that the danger of the Nixon Presidency lies not in exaggeration but in timidity, that his administration will turn out to be more Coolidgean than Johnsonian. Yet unless there has been a fundamental change in his personality (as Theodore White and others think there has been), Nixon has within him a very strong drive for personal power—especially *independent* power—which pushes him away from reliance on anyone else and pulls him toward stubborn insistence on showing everyone that he can win out on his own. Throughout his life he has experienced sharp alternations between periods of quiet and periods of crisis. These discontinuities in his experience have contributed to the uncertainties nearly all observers have felt in interpreting the "real" Nixon. On the one hand, he is a shrewd, calm, careful, proper, almost fussily conventional man of moderation, a mildly self-deprecating commonsense burgher. On the other hand, he has been a fighter, a rip-snorting indignant, a dramatic contender for his own moral vision. To say that the first theme traces to his mother and the second to his father is but the beginning of an explanation of a pattern in which alternation has substituted for resolution. The temptation for one of his character type is to follow a period of self-sacrificing service with a declaration of independence, a move which is necessary exactly because it breaks through the web of dependencies he feels gathering around him.

Add to this character a style in which intimacy and consultation have never been easy and in which isolated soul-searching is habitual. Add to that an explicit theory and system of decision-making in which the President listens inquiringly to his committees of officials (who have been encouraged in their own independence), then retires to make his personal choice, then emerges to announce that choice. The temptation to surprise them all and, when the issue is defined as critically important, to adhere to it adamantly is exacerbated by the mechanisms of decision. Add also hostile reporters given unusual access, an increasingly independent Senate, a generationally-polarized nation, and a set of substantive problems nearly impossible to "solve" and the stage is set for tragic drama.

Another President once dismissed Nixon as a "chronic campaigner." In a campaign, day by day, the product is a speech or other public appearance. The big decisions are what to say. In the Presidency, rhetoric is immensely important, but preliminary: the product is a movement by the government. To bring that about Nixon needs to succeed not only with the national audience (where the danger of impromptu, "sincere" commitment is already great) and with the audience of himself alone (where the danger of self-deception is evident), but also with that middle range of professional President-watchers in Washington. Managing their anticipated reactions requires not only the development of "options," but widening circles of consultation around a tentative Presidential decision—in other words, consultation *after* the President has reached a course of action satisfactory to him. It is at that point that the President's friends can help him most. For it is not true in the Presidency that, as Nixon wrote of 1960: "In the final analysis I knew that what was most important was that I must be myself."■



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# The Shakedown Cruise

by Jerry Landauer

At first glance the Seafarers International Union scarcely seems to be a promising platform from which to campaign for the presidency of the AFL-CIO. The SIU's membership of 45,000 is relatively small, and its net assets of $462,913 hardly make it a financial giant of organized labor. Furthermore, violence has stained the union's reputation. One vice president was recently convicted of what amounted to terrorism, and opposition from within is discouraged by occasional beatings when the presence of beefy musclemen at union meetings fails to suppress dissent.

To join the SIU costs a minimum of $1,100—$300 in initiation fees, plus at least $800 to cover special assessments. A new man must retroactively pay all assessments levied on the membership since 1940. But it cannot be said that SIU president Paul Hall is singlemindedly devoted to the needs of the unlicensed seamen who pay these country-club-sized fees. He finds time to run hard for the top job in organized labor; to trade heavily on the stock exchanges; to file personal expense vouchers for $52,470 in one year; and to collect, in the same year (1967), two salaries simultaneously—$11,056 from the international union and $21,326 from its largest constituent local.

These and other eyebrow-raising practices of a poor union in a sick industry would surely disqualify a man less glib, brainy, and ambitious than Paul Hall from entertaining aspirations for higher office. But, at 55, he remains a leading candidate to step up when AFL-

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CIO president George Meany, 75, steps down. Hall's chances have been improving ever since Walter Reuther eliminated himself by withdrawing the United Auto Workers from the labor federation to forge an alliance with the outcast Teamsters. Indeed, Hall may well succeed—particularly if the Vietnam war continues.

Because his enhanced power within the labor movement is largely based on the war, Hall holds at least associate membership in what Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird has rechristened "the military-industrial-labor team." He benefits from the requirements of Vietnam shipping, which swell the SIU membership rolls, and from the war-induced eagerness with which Congress doles out $200 to $300 million a year to keep the merchant marine afloat. More important, the war gives Hall access to large sums of money, enabling him to become labor's leading political financier. His influence reaches not only into Congress and the executive branch, but into city councils and state legislatures as well.

Ironically, too, much of the political cash Hall controls comes indirectly from the taxpayers via the Pentagon. The war keeps at least 100 ships busy carrying fuel and supplies to Vietnam. Many of these ships, under charter to the Military Sea Transportation Service, are manned by SIU crews. But not all the seamen are American citizens. Foreigners eager to earn the higher wages paid aboard ships flying the U.S. flag make up a sizable percentage of the crews, and aliens wanting work must open their pay envelopes to the union's persuasive collectors.

Payday aboard the *S.S. Western Planet*, a tanker ferrying fuel from the Persian gulf to Vietnam, offers a glimpse of how SIU fund-raising operates. American crew members Warren Messenger, Harry Kaufman, Fred Anderson, Luther Dills, and Harry Dorer contributed, respectively, $6, $5, $4, $10, and $14 to the union's special political fund. But 14 aliens "gave" $1,400—all in sums of precisely $100 each—and a number of Filipino nationals were induced to part with even more: $300 from Eugenio Betingue and $200 each from Jose Belang, A. B. Reyes, Ignace Hernandez, and Guidlerne Echevarria.

The Filipino sailors manning the *Western Planet* signed aboard through the SIU hiring hall near Manila. Japanese seamen hired in Yokohama must fork out still larger sums for the right to work on taxpayer-financed ships shuttling to the war zone. Two paydays spaced six weeks apart aboard the tanker *S. S. St. Lawrence*, for example, netted nearly $8,000 for the SIU's political fund, including $500 each from such seagoing political philanthropists as Jintoku Toma, Jinyu Yariku, Tsubio Kohatsu, Seigi Uehara, and Koichi Miyazato. The few American seamen who contributed at all ordinarily tossed in a token $2.

The pattern is invariable: only the names change. From among foreigners manning the *S. S. Transglobe*, a ship carrying military vehicles, Hall's agents scooped up $6,750 in one voyage, with such men as Gunvald Larsen, Oddbjorn Fritzoe, and Lars Alvin each "contributing" $500. Aboard the *S. S. Sea Pioneer*, Tan Joek Kwang ($100), Low Chuen Choek ($100), Lim Bian Seng ($100), Alejandro DeWindt ($200), and Manuel Taguacta ($150) helped to swell the union's political fund. From the *S. S. St. Christopher*, Hall was able to count on large sums from such vigorous trade unionists as Demetre Svolopolous ($100), Seiei Tamashiro ($420), Ryoei Higa ($490), Seishin Ikehara ($460), and Motoyuki Nakasone ($440)..

All these rivulets build into a mighty money stream that no other AFL-CIO union, not even the million-member Steelworkers, can match. In 1968 Hall's campaign kitty reached the astonishing



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sum of $1,028,458. The amount "donated" by foreign sailors may be inferred from the meager contributions recorded for the union brass: Hall and Al Kerr, the union's secretary-treasurer, have not put in anything like $100 each.

The union clearly violates the law. It fails, for one thing, to identify donors of $100 or more, as required by the Federal Corrupt Practices Act; to list them would make mincemeat of the union's claim that all contributors to the political that all contributors to the political fund are merely "expressing their right to participate in the American political process."

Illegality aside, the spectacle of foreign sailors giving up one-third of their pay to support candidates for political office in an alien land could be regarded as just another example of ingenious union fund-raising if it were not so clearly a result of the Vietnam war—and if it did not cost the taxpayers so many millions of dollars. For whether the hat-passing occurs aboard the *Transglobe*, the *Sea Pioneer*, the *Cosmos Trader*, the *Western Hunter*, or the *Canton Victory*, money flowing to the $1 million fund follows what might be called a viscous circle: from the federal Treasury to operators of ships chartered by the Pentagon: from the operators to alien seamen in the form of premium wages (men sailing in the war zone receive bonus pay); from the seamen to waiting union collectors; from them to a bank near union headquarters in Brooklyn where the money is deposited in the account of the Seafarers Political Activity Donation Committee; and from that committee, headed by Hall, to politicians who support Hall's objectives. The greatest of these objectives—one shared by maritime management, which winks at Hall's money-raising methods—is the extraction of more millions to subsidize the construction and operation of merchant ships.

Logically, these subsidies ought to be a leading target of the Congressional economy bloc, for, despite the expenditure of $2.6 billion in the last decade, U.S.-flag ships now carry less than six per cent of America's overseas trade. But while the Pentagon budget is being scrutinized as never before, maritime subsidies somehow escape even a cursory critical gaze. On the contrary, Congress often votes more than the executive branch asks for.

House "debate" on the subsidy authorizations for fiscal year 1970 offers a particularly revealing example of the maritime lobby's muscle. Though the recommendations of the House Merchant Marine Committee exceeded budget requests by $124.3 million, not one member rose to challenge the spending splurge. Discussion of the bill on the House floor consumed just six pages of the *Congressional Record;* of the 13 members who spoke, 10 regularly receive campaign gifts from the SIU. In the House Appropriations Committee, shipping subsidies command a sacrosanct status that eludes even the emotion-packed issue of "law and order." Some weeks ago the Appropriations Committee pruned $47 million from the Nixon Administration's crime-fighting budget while adding $164 million to the same bill for ship construction.

Paul Hall and his maritime allies win defensive battles with equal ease. In 1967, the Johnson Administration strained mightily to shift the subsidy-dispensing Maritime Administration from the Department of Commerce to the new Department of Transportation. This was widely regarded as a sensible proposal, since the new department could not be expected to untangle the transportation mess if waterborne commerce lay beyond its jurisdiction. But the SIU opposed the transfer, fearing that control of maritime policy might shift from the maritime lobby ("one of Washington's most powerful sub-governments," according to former Mari-

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time Administrator Nicholas Johnson) to a strong Secretary of Transportation. One swift blizzard of telegrams costing $3,419 (from the SIU political fund) helped to smother the plan; it was overwhelmingly defeated on the House floor.

Such victories are not won by persuasion alone. Since heavy intensification of the war in Vietnam in 1965 (and the inauguration of SIU fund-raising cruises in its wake), the SIU has ladled campaign gifts to no less than 150 Congressional districts. Virtually any friendly Congressman can have $500 or $1,000 merely for the asking. If a Congressman heads a committee important to the SIU, he can count on unlimited cash, as well as union-provided sound trucks, literature, and doorbell-ringers.

In 1966, for example, Hall's political fund pumped no less than $17,000 into the Baltimore campaign of Congressman Edward Garmatz (D-Md.), chairman of the House Merchant Marine Committee; without such massive help (plus at least $25,000 more from other maritime interests) Garmatz might well have lost a tough primary fight. Last year the SIU went all out for Senator Warren Magnuson (D-Wash.), chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee; in just the first three months of 1968, six committees working for Magnuson's re-election each received a check for $5,000.

The SIU's clever Capitol Hill operatives also make friends for Hall in subtler ways. Speaker John McCormack generally runs for re-election unopposed, so the union contributes to a McCormack scholarship fund instead. The 52nd Assembly District Democratic Club in Brooklyn is the home base of John Rooney, chairman of the House Appropriations subcommittee handling maritime subsidies; the club regularly receives union checks. Sam Friedel's Crosstown Democratic Club in Baltimore is always short of "walk-around" money to bring out the city's heavy Negro vote; the SIU gladly helps because Friedel is the second-ranking Democrat on the House Commerce Committee.

Further help for friendly lawmakers comes in the form of free campaign literature from a union-owned print shop, called Log Press. In the last campaign the shop churned out $3,200 worth of political propaganda for Congressman Emanuel Celler of New York, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee. Dozens of other Congressmen, from West Virginia to Wyoming, similarly benefited. Every year, too, Hall's union sponsors a trip to New York for Congressmen. To take care of this year's Congressional contingent Hall dipped into the union political fund for $4,925.

The combination of heavy campaign spending and clever lobbying gives Hall a hammerlock on maritime legislation and helps quench whatever Congressional curiosity there may be about the source of all his money. The overflowing political fund, equally important to his campaign for the presidency of the AFL-CIO, gives him easy access to leaders of both parties. In July, for example, no less than a dozen important politicians showed up to address the union's 14th biennial convention at Washington's Statler Hilton Hotel. The luminaries included House Majority Leader Carl Albert (D-Okla.) and Minority Leader Gerald Ford (R-Mich.). In part, no doubt, Ford's appearance was his way of thanking Hall for campaign gifts of $28,000 to the GOP Congressional Campaign Committee. The speeches generated valuable, prestige-building publicity for Hall; Ford's, moreover, was particularly sweet. Ford plugged for the broadening of subsidy payments to cover more of the ships manned by the SIU. He also pledged that the Nixon Administration would not propose building ships in cheaper foreign yards—a step that would weaken shipyard unions allied to the SIU.

Nor does the SIU ignore local poli-



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tics. It contributes to mayoralty campaigns from Tampa, Florida, to Pompton Lakes, New Jersey; to candidates for district attorney in the Bronx; to campaigners for the General Assembly in Virginia; to municipal judges in Manhattan; to gubernatorial campaigns in Florida, Maryland, Michigan, and New York. The campaign of Eddie Sapir for city councilman in New Orleans suggests the union's extraordinary attention to the details of local politics. There, according to secret union records, Paul Hall's men financed a fish fry, sponsored a rally, printed posters, supervised campaign workers, picked up a $600 bill for postage, contributed $3,000 in cash to the campaign, and spent $279.93 to hire "protection service" for the candidate.

Presidential campaigns receive commensurately more. Early last year committees quietly working for Lyndon Johnson's renomination received $50,000 from the SIU. Hubert Humphrey's candidacy gobbled up at least $215,000 more. After the election several dozen labor leaders, including George Meany, retreated to the SIU's spiffy training base at Piney Point, Maryland, to assess the reasons for Humphrey's defeat. But in April of this year Hall's lobbyists unashamedly bought $10,000 worth of tickets to Richard Nixon's festive "victory dinner." So far, the union has little reason to rue Nixon's victory, and it has reason to celebrate his appointment of Helen Delich Bentley to head the Federal Maritime Commission. "The hardest salesmen for the American merchant marine on Capitol Hill," she wrote admiringly, "are those people educated in the SIU-Hall way."

Hall's educational apparatus is formidable indeed. His classroom is the elegantly paneled auditorium of the Transportation Institute, an organization set up by the SIU in downtown Washington to thump the drums for our "citizen-manned" merchant marine (nothing is ever said about those generous foreign sailors). The students, as former newspaperwoman Bentley has written, are members of Congress; the faculty consists mostly of men representing 39 independent unions belonging to the AFL-CIO's Maritime Trades Department, which Hall heads.

One thing to be noted is that many, perhaps even most, of the 39 supposedly maritime-minded unions in the MTD are no more than casually concerned about the state of the merchant marine. The Leather Goods Workers are represented. The Upholsterers belong. So do the Toymakers, the Office Employees, the Carpenters, the Meat Cutters, the Barbers, the Restaurant Employees, the Potters, the Bookbinders, the Grain Millers, the Distillery Workers. But though the leaders of these unions may never have set foot aboard a merchant ship, they have all been pulled into Paul Hall's orbit—by SIU money, by organizing help, or by the supply of burly pickets who help weaker unions beat off Teamster raids. In return, the MTD unions are supposed to vote for Hall when the time comes to choose George Meany's successor.

In Paul Hall's school, moreover, the faculty sits back listening while the students speak. Once a week, through most of the year, a member of Congress comes down from Capitol Hill to address what might be called the "military-industrial-labor team" of the maritime industry—assembled MTD leaders, plus guests from the Pentagon and the steamship companies. Speaking to the team need not be taxing. Hall's stable of speechwriters will instantly provide a text for those Congressmen who haven't time to compose their own. And, as Hall himself put it, "there's nothing like an honorarium to make a guy show up." The work can be remunerative, for enough foreign seamen sail SIU ships to let Hall pay $500 or even $1,000 for an hour of any Congressman's time. ■



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# THE MAKING OF A MAJORITY
# The Senate and the ABM

by Nathan Miller

Two days before the Senate approved President Nixon's plan to deploy the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile system by a single vote, Senator James B. Pearson, a thoughtful Kansas Republican, discussed the significance of the marathon debate.

"You know, this issue will come as close as any to turning on the quiet consciences of the individual Senators," he told a visitor. "The Senate would be a powerful instrument if all the issues were debated in this manner."

Not since the summer of 1941, when the House approved continuation of the draft by one vote, had a President's decision on an issue of national security been so narrowly supported. Opponents were to talk of a Pyrrhic victory, but just as the draft could be continued or suspended by a single vote, so could an ABM system.

How was this one-vote victory won? What were the forces brought to bear on the "quiet consciences" of the individual Senators? How much influence did those forces have on the result?

Shortly before the President's March 14th decision to deploy Safeguard, a small group of men met with Bryce N. Harlow, the Administration's chief Congressional lobbyist, in his office down the corridor from Mr. Nixon's own Oval Office. Their job was to sell the ABM to a reluctant nation and a recalcitrant Senate. Independent polls indicated an Administration defeat, or at least a stand-off. Forty-five Senators were opposed to the ABM; only 25 favored it; 30 were uncommitted. For a year, ABM opponents had been building an effective network of grassroots organizations, many of them based on opposition to the Vietnam war. "We all knew we had a long road and a hill ahead," Harlow was to say later.

Ironically, the Administration regarded Safeguard as a compromise. Unlike the Sentinel system approved by President Johnson for deployment in the suburbs, Safeguard was to protect the nation's nuclear deterrent out on the Great Plains.

But as everyone at the meeting was aware, far more than the fate of another weapons system was at stake. Mr. Nixon had called the ABM "absolutely essential" to the nation's security. But to many Senators, it had become the symbol of misplaced priorities—priorities that allocated $79 billion for military spending while civilian needs went begging. Under the bi-partisan leadership of Senators John Sherman Cooper, the highly respected Kentucky Republican, and Philip A. Hart, the liberal Michigan Democrat, opposition to the ABM had grown rapidly during 1968 and the first two months of this year. Backed by scientific briefings and staff memoranda, aided by the growing outcry from the suburbs, their support had widened to the point where it approached a majority of the Senate.

But this White House meeting was to produce a carefully orchestrated campaign directed by Herbert G. Klein, the Administration's director of communications. Even opponents were to

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call it "one of the most sophisticated and professional jobs of lobbying we've ever seen." Before the battle was over, the President, the White House staff, the Pentagon, individual Senators, the scientific community, defense contractors, and the public participated in what became the most passionate struggle in recent legislative history.

Administration lobbyists quickly wrote off the opponents; energies and arguments must concentrate on the uncommitted, they agreed, and the approach must be soft sell.

"Twisting arms and wrenching sockets would leave too much scar tissue," said one of the men who attended the White House staff meeting. "We decided that if the system was worth anything at all it would sell itself—but we had to make sure that our side of the story got told."

That was Herb Klein's job. Within hours of the President's announcement of his Safeguard plan, newspapers all over the country received thick packets of information supporting Mr. Nixon's stand. Such ABM supporters as Vice President Spiro T. Agnew and Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird followed up with television appearances. But before long, Senator Edward M. Kennedy was organizing a national movement against deployment of Safeguard.

## Party Loyalty

The first dividends of the Administration's campaign were not long in accruing. Immediately after the Presidential announcement, Senator Hugh A. Scott (R-Pa.), the newly named minority whip, switched from opposition to support of the ABM. His defection was to provide the majority of one—although no one knew it at the time.

Party loyalty, rather than the issue itself, persuaded Senator Scott. Although he was to remain open to compromise, he felt it improper for one of the Administration's own floor leaders to oppose the President on an issue of national security.

Within four days, nine other Senators switched from the undecided column to support of the ABM, including the late Everett M. Dirksen (D-Ill.), then minority leader. Now, an Associated Press poll showed 44 Senators firmly opposed to Safeguard, 35 for it, and 21 uncommitted.

The opponents picked up a vote, too. Jim Pearson, who had originally voted for Sentinel, joined the opposition, saying deployment would be inconsistent with the spirit of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and would make "only a marginal contribution" to security.

Even though the polls favored the opposition, their leaders were cautious. The Senate majority leader, Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.), said that if the President decided to use the full weight of his office, it was his guess "that as of now there would be enough votes to uphold the President's decision." But Mansfield emphasized that a vote was still months away.

Both sides laid plans for a long campaign, with their most effective propaganda timed to take effect at the tail end of the debate. Scientific witnesses appeared before various committees, where they gave conflicting views based on the same evidence. Secretary Laird produced the claim that the Russians were trying for "a first strike" that would knock out unprotected Minuteman missiles in their silos.

With the Nixon Administration being given a respite on Vietnam, such prominent "doves" as Senators J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.), Albert Gore (D-Tenn.), Jacob K. Javits (R-N.Y.), and Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) joined in the fight against the ABM. Already in the works since February was what was to be known as the "Kennedy report," a book of 16 articles by leading scientists and other experts contesting the necessity



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and feasibility of the ABM. A proposed Sentinel site in the Boston suburbs had brought Senator Kennedy into the fight, along with volunteers recruited from the Harvard-MIT complex.

While he was ostensibly looking out for the interests of his constituents, nothing that Kennedy did could be divorced from national politics. Furthermore, he had just been elected assistant majority leader. Some members of the new Administration were convinced his anti-ABM activities were part of a grand design leading to the Presidential election of 1972. The fact that he might well be the next President had no small influence on potential recruits to the anti-ABM forces.

To combat anti-ABM organizations, the Administration set up its own lobbying groups, the most prominent being the Citizens Committee for Peace and Security, headed by William J. Casey, a New York lawyer with White House connections.

President Nixon maintained a low profile during this stage of the maneuvering, limiting himself to a few telephone calls and personal chats with uncommitted Senators. But other members of his Administration were active.

Determined to hold onto the dozen or so Republicans who were against the ABM, the opposition had carefully nutured a bi-partisan approach. But Representative Rogers C. B. Morton (R-Md.), the vigorous new chairman of the Republican National Committee, moved to drive a wedge between the opponents by raising the issue of party loyalty.

The move drew quick protests from Republican opponents of Safeguard. Particularly angered was Senator Charles H. Percy (R-Ill.), one of the earliest ABM foes, who declared that "this is not a clear-cut case of party loyalty but a national issue. There cannot and must not be a loyalty test." Vice President Agnew traveled the country trying to persuade GOP dissidents to come to the aid of the party. Senator Percy's staff reported that there was considerable "heat" on him from home.

Morton denied pressuring anybody, but following the Percy protest there was a noticeable decline in overt action by the national committee. However, this caution did not extend to some middle-level government officials, who took up free-lance lobbying for the ABM on their own.

The experience of Senator William B. Saxbe, a freshman Republican from Ohio who opposed Safeguard, was typical. One day a federal official telephoned to warn him that his anti-ABM stand was going to cost him some patronage. "At first, I was burned up about it, but I later put it down to general ineptitude," the Senator said. "I checked on this guy and he didn't have a damn thing to do with patronage."

Another freshman, Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., (R-Md.), disclosed that when he called a regulatory agency about a problem, he was told: "We might give more attention to your ideas if you would get on the team."

Senator Pearson also had several brushes with the Administration. First, an Army general informed an aircraft manufacturer in Kansas that the Pentagon might not be able to go through with a contract if Safeguard were defeated. Then he was not given advance notice—a standard courtesy for Senators—when the Administration acted favorably on his request that some federal offices not be moved out of Kansas. So he lost the chance to take credit at home. Finally, the Department of Agriculture, after having given its private blessing to a bill Pearson had proposed, abruptly changed its mind.

By early May, the polls showed that the Administration was rapidly gaining votes. Forty-three Senators now favored the ABM, 47 were opposed, and 10 remained uncommitted. Three previously



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uncommitted Republican freshmen swung behind the President at this point—Robert W. Packwood of Oregon, Robert Dole of Kansas, and Henry Bellmon of Oklahoma.

Bellmon's support turned on the forced resignation of a young Treasury Department tax expert, accused by the Senator of being a "highly partisan" Democrat who should be replaced by a deserving Republican. Treasury officials had fought Bellmon's demands for the removal of Paul R. McDaniel, an Oklahoman accused of "leaking" information to Fred Harris, the state's senior Senator and chairman of the Democratic National Committee. But they finally yielded when the White House passed the word that Senator Bellmon was threatening to vote against Safeguard.

Senator Packwood's decision was interpreted as a declaration of independence of Oregon's senior Senator, Mark O. Hatfield, a leading Republican foe of the ABM. Senator Hatfield had given at least tacit support to Wayne L. Morse, Packwood's Democratic opponent in 1968.

## Nixon as Lobbyist

While Harlow and his deputy, Kenneth Belieu, prospected for votes on Capitol Hill, President Nixon was becoming by far the most effective Administration lobbyist. He began scurrying from Senator to Senator, applying his own brand of friendly persuasion. A steady stream of Senators had breakfast, lunch, dinner, and countless cups of coffee with him.

Mr. Nixon was personally involved in the lobbying effort much more deeply than most people realize. He saw many members in private—many of them alone, without even a staff member present, so that the Senator involved was free to keep the conversation to himself if he chose.

The locus of such talks varied, but most of them occurred in the President's office, or in the family dining room on the second floor of the White House, or in the East Room after Sunday services, or on evening cruises down the Potomac on the Presidential yacht, *Sequoia*. Mr. Nixon stated and restated this chief argument: that ABM deployment would carry weight in arms-limitation talks with the Russians and in dealing with the Chinese over the next decade.

"He pointed out that a plan can't progress until you try it, and this thing (the ABM) has been researched to death," Harlow recounted. "He emphasized the flexibility of his approach to the ABM."

Meanwhile, with a small staff of his own and an array of Pentagon people, Belieu, a former Army colonel who lost a leg in Korea, operated what he called "an educational effort" at the Capitol. Material was prepared for Senators who wanted clarification of various points. Administration witnesses were coached. Pentagon briefings were arranged.

This team operated out of Senator Dirksen's inner office, just down the hall from the Senate chamber. The room came with a private entrance, leather club chairs, a yellow sofa of faintly Empire antecedents, a well-stocked bar, and a large picture of the host with his hair as tangled as if he had just stepped out of a speeding convertible.

Since almost every Senator favored continued research and development, the Administration emphasized to the uncommitted that deployment of Safeguard at missile sites in Montana and North Dakota should be considered "applied research." With Senators confused by conflicting technical arguments, the lobbyists used the argument that it would weaken the President's hand to go to disarmament talks without the ABM. If that failed to persuade, they told the waverers that the best policy is to follow the lead of the President on security matters.

These turned out to be effective



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arguments, especially with the older members. Thus, the ABM further underscored the widening generation gap in the Senate: of the 21 newest Senators, 12 were to oppose the ABM; but of the 19 most senior, only five would.

## Paper Warfare

Now both sides began to set off the propaganda salvos they had been preparing for months. First out was the "Kennedy report," which concluded that the ABM "cannot perform effectively the missions suggested for it" but could launch a new arms race. Within two months, it was to sell 13,000 copies in hardback and 150,000 in paperback.

On the other side, William J. Casey's pro-ABM lobby began to swing into action, with full-page newspaper advertisements proclaiming that "84 per cent of all Americans support an ABM system." Although Casey denied knowledge of it, an inquiry showed that defense industries were well represented among the ad's sponsors. Angry ABM foes, hotly contending that the poll results were loaded, got an unexpected crack at Casey when the President nominated him to be a member of the General Advisory Committee of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Since such a nomination requires Senate confirmation, Casey had to appear before Senator Fulbright's Foreign Relations Committee, where the anti-ABM sentiment was strong. The committee confirmed the Casey nomination, but not until its members had discredited the advertisement.

During the hearing, Senator Symington reported that he had received a letter from a business acquaintance questioning his opposition to the ABM, then told Casey:

"It was, I thought, a very unusual letter. So I called him up and said, 'Why do you write me a letter about this? You do not know anything more about the ABM than I know about the products you sell. It's not your line of work.' He said, 'Well, I have been slugged into writing a few people,' and I said, 'Who slugged you?' and your name was mentioned first."

George D. Aiken (R-Vt.), the Senate's senior Republican, told Casey he had received 58 letters after the ad had appeared in three Vermont papers. Fifty-three opposed the ABM and only five favored it, he told Casey.

"I'd say since then probably the percentage has dropped to maybe five-or six-to-one, but it is overwhelming in opposition," said the old Yankee, who was still uncommitteed. "You are costing the taxpayers a lot of money because I have to answer all these letters."

Twenty-two companies in 16 states had a financial stake in the ABM, and most were careful to avoid open Congressional lobbying. But three major ABM contractors—Motorola, General Electric, and Lockheed—contributed to the American Security Council, a conservative organization financed by private industry that took an active part in the fight for the ABM.

At almost the exact time the "Kennedy report" came out, the ASC issued its own analysis of the ABM, contending that Safeguard was part of a system "designed to give the American people a seamless garment of security in an age of nuclear danger." It distributed 20,000 copies of the report. But even more important to the pro-ABM campaign, the ASC mounted a massive direct-mail operation which flooded Senate offices with thousands of letters.

The ever-tightening struggle for votes continued. In early June a poll showed 48 votes against Safeguard and 47 for it. The months of strain began to tell on those involved. As one senatorial staff member muttered at the time: "We're deluged by the ABM; sickened by the ABM; drowned by the ABM."

Part of the folklore of Capitol Hill



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is that Congress abhors a confrontation. It was not surprising, then, that some members became seriously concerned by the prospect of the Senate and the White House drifting out of control toward a collision. They began to search for a way out.

"The Administration can win by one or two or three votes," said Mike Mansfield, "but that's what they called in Roman days a Pyrrhic victory. It would be better to compromise."

Senator Scott, a reluctant ABM supporter, agreed. Although he maintained that the President would win, Scott suggested that Mr. Nixon might compromise if he wanted unified Congressional support—the type Scott felt was needed "from the standpoint of influencing world opinion."

From up in New Hampshire, where Republican Senator Thomas J. McIntyre had gone on a speaking trip among his constituents, came a proposal that looked like a workable compromise—deployment of the computers and radars at the sites in Montana and North Dakota would go through, but there would be an indefinite delay on establishing missile launchers and acquiring land for 10 other planned ABM complexes.

The response was less than enthusiastic. The White House said the President rejected the notion of a compromise. ABM opponents, who saw the McIntyre plan as "a disguised deployment," said they would vote funds only for continued research and development at the Kwajalein test area in the Pacific—and not for deployment of any kind.

Senator McIntyre philosophically brushed off these responses. He sat back to wait until one side or the other realized that it was going to lose if it refused to compromise.

## The Uncommitted Five

At long last, floor debate on the ABM got underway on July 8th. According to all of the standard Racing Forms, the Senate was almost equally divided. That morning, Senator John C. Stennis (D-Miss.), floor manager of the military-procurement authorization bill which contained $759.1 million for the first phase of Safeguard, came to the press gallery for the first time in 22 years. "Boys," he said, "I feel like I'm going to war."

Two days after the debate began the opponents received their biggest psychological lift. Senator Aiken announced that he was opposed to immediate deployment of the ABM and urged the President to compromise to save his plan from defeat.

With the canny old Yankee saying that Safeguard was dead without modification, observers believed that a compromise was now just a matter of time. Without such a proposal, Aiken said, he favored an amendment by Cooper and Hart that would limit spending to research and development at Kwajalein but bar deployment.

A worried Senator Barry M. Goldwater (R-Ariz.) went to the White House to urge President Nixon to make a televised plea for Safeguard. Administration lobbyists began calling defense contractors around the country urging them to put in a word for the ABM with uncommitted Senators.

Now there appeared to be just five: Senators Mike Gravel (D-Alaska); Warren G. Magnuson (D-Wash.), Clinton P. Anderson (D-N.M.), John J. Williams (R-Del.), and McIntyre.

One of the surprising things about the running series of nose counts taken by both sides was that some potential votes were based on assumptions. Senate lore had much to do with these assumptions, for one of the unwritten rules is that you do not ceaselessly importune a Senator for his vote.

One assumption gone awry, as it turned out, involved the vote of Senator Winston L. Prouty (R-Vt.). After



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Aiken stated his position, the ABM opponents began to take Prouty's vote for granted. He had voted against Sentinel, was thought to be under the senior Senator's influence, and could therefore be counted upon to vote against Safeguard. Or so the assumption went.

But Senator Prouty had problems of his own. He had—and still has—the prospect of a tough fight for re-election next year. Senator John G. Tower (R-Tex.), a major ABM proponent, was and is chairman of the Republican Senatorial Campaign Committee, which has a large campaign kitty at its disposal. Besides, President Nixon is popular in Vermont, and a strong endorsement from him would help. The schoolmasterish-looking Vermonter visited Belieu's command post with greater frequency. He received a briefing at the Pentagon, and, more importantly, he accepted invitations to four Potomac cruises with the President.



The opponents finally got wind of this. On July 13th, Senator Cooper tried to call Prouty at home to persuade him to hold off a decision until later in the week, when the opposition would present its arguments at a secret session of the Senate. But it was Sunday morning, and Senator Prouty was out. He had gone to the White House for church services. The sermon that day was "The Great Adventure," linking the imminent moon shot with President Nixon's upcoming Asian tour. Over coffee in the State Dining Room after the service, Senator Prouty told the President he had made up his mind. He was going to vote for the ABM.

The news engulfed the ABM opponents in gloom. They regarded the loss as critical but not fatal. One of them put their situation in baseball terms: "If we had Prouty, the ball game would be over. Without him, it's extra innings."

At this point, the opposition was counting on 47 solid votes and figured that the Administration had 45 certain votes, with three others leaning its way. To win, then, the opposition needed four of the five publicly uncommitted votes.

But the weekend after Senator Prouty announced his decision to the President, the opponents suffered another, more unexpected blow. Senator Kennedy's car plunged into a Cape Cod pond under bizarre circumstances, taking the life of a young secretary—and much of the Senator's influence—with it. "It's difficult to say that things would have been different if Kennedy had been here," an anti-ABM strategist said of the crucial week following the accident. "But he did miss seven or eight days of the debate, and the loss of his influence just might have made the difference."

## Baptism of Gravel

"I'm the only freshman who is still uncommitted, and everybody seems to think that because I'm a freshman I can



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be muscled around."

This was Senator Mike Gravel, a 39-year-old Alaskan, describing his misadventures as the only new Senator who had taken no position on the ABM. (Pressure on older members was never so strong. As Senator Magnuson put it, "I've been around here for 33 years. It's pretty hard to exert pressure on me.")

The heat on Gravel came partly from Alaska oil men who thought a vote for Safeguard would insure federal authorization to exploit Alaska's extremely valuable oil reserves. Some sources say that the oil men came into the picture at the behest of oil men from Texas, Senator Tower's home state.

In any case, the most important pro-ABM influence on Gravel was Senator Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.), an expert on military affairs, a "hawk" on Safeguard, and President Nixon's first choice for Secretary of Defense. Jackson had long since adopted the role of mentor to his young colleague. After Gravel won the Democratic nomination last year, both Jackson and Magnuson held a fund-raising affair for him in Seattle. When he came to Washington to be sworn in, it was "Scoop" Jackson who escorted him down the aisle of the Senate.

Thus, it was natural for Jackson to try to persuade Gravel to vote for Safeguard. He took him to the White House and provided briefcases bulging with information supporting deployment. But there were increasingly clear indications that Gravel, while still giving the impression of neutrality, had already made up his mind to vote against it.

On August 4th, he and Jackson met in the Senate cloakroom. After an angry discussion, Senator Jackson declared: "If you vote against the ABM, it's going to cause you problems around here." As a witness put it: "That's about as strong as one Senator ever gets with another Senator—maybe stronger."

The next day, Gravel formally announced his intention to oppose deployment by supporting the Cooper-Hart amendment.

Gravel still refuses to discuss his encounter with Jackson. But in talking about the effect his decision may have on his relations with the Administration, he shrugs and says, "I can see the situation where I will want something badly and reach out for it—and then the meat cleaver will come down on my hand."

Gravel's decision left four uncommitted Senators. A secret session of the Senate, which turned into a noisy duel of charts between Jackson and Symington, changed no minds.

## Then There Were Two

The opposition received one last boost: McIntyre and Magnuson came out against the ABM. Unable to get the Administration, now sensing victory, to accept his plan, McIntyre said he would vote for the Cooper-Hart proposal.

Magnuson had been under strong pressure to vote for Safeguard to insure continued funding for the SST being built by the Boeing Company, the largest employer in his home state. Yet he remained one of the few Senators to resist the President's moonlit arguments on the *Sequoia*.

"He told me to 'let me know how you feel and I want to let you know how I feel.' I told him," the gruff old veteran said. He went on to vote against Safeguard, he said, because the weight of scientific opinion suggested that "it may never work."

This narrowed down the "uncommitted" to only two: the ailing and uncommunicative Senator Anderson, 73, and lame-duck Senator Williams of Delaware, who had already said he would not run for re-election in 1970 because he thinks people should retire at 65. Opponents expected Williams to vote with the Administration, but they had



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some hope about Anderson. After all, Anderson had expressed some concern that an issue of such importance would be decided on such a close vote.

With the voting only two days away, Senator Hart was saying the Senate was split 50 to 50, even if both uncommitted members turned out to be pro-ABM. A tie would give the Administration a victory—but it would be a moral victory for the opposition.

"We don't count moral victories around here," snapped Senator Tower. "It's the final vote that counts." And he confidently predicted that the final vote would be 51 to 49 in favor of the Administration. If his tally were correct, it meant that one of the members being counted upon to vote for the Cooper-Hart amendment was actually opposed to it.

Observers combed their lists in search of a likely suspect.

## Cherchez La Femme

Could it be Senator Edward W. Brooke (R-Mass.)? To him, the threat to peace of the ABM was secondary to the multiple warhead (MIRV). He wanted the Administration to declare a moratorium on testing. Could the President have secured his vote with such a promise?

What about Senator Howard W. Cannon (D-Nev.)? He had originally voted for Sentinel but had voted against Safeguard in the Armed Services Committee. Nevada voters were worried that ABM deployment could mean continued nuclear testing in the state, which might frighten away tourist business. There were reports that $11 million trimmed from a Nevada water project might be restored if he voted right.

That night, Senator Margaret Chase Smith (R-Maine), the ranking minority member of the Armed Services Committee who had consistently opposed the ABM in any form for over a year, quietly met with William C. Lewis, her administrative assistent, and drew up what she was later to call "a simple amendment" to the procurement bill.

The next afternoon, as Herb Klein was making a final call to newsmen to tell them George Meany, president of the AFL-CIO, was willing to make a pro-ABM statement if asked, Mrs. Smith came to the Senate floor.

Senator Fulbright was addressing a nearly empty chamber. Mrs. Smith, a 71-year-old widow known for her independence and the fresh rose she wears every day, chatted briefly with Senator Stennis. Then she asked Senator Fulbright for "30 seconds" of his time, quickly dropped her amendment on the clerk's desk, and walked out.

Senator Hart took a quick look at it and was "confused and distressed." The amendment, he discovered, went much further than the Cooper-Hart proposal. It would prevent any funds at all from being spent on Safeguard, including research and development.

"The Republicans had been telling me all along that they had 30 votes on their side, but I could count only 29," said an elated "Scoop" Jackson. "As soon as she put in that amendment I knew she was the 30th."

Senators Cooper and Hart professed to be unalarmed. They said her amendment was "consistent" with Mrs. Smith's previous position. She had sponsored an anti-ABM amendment in committee, and, in 1968, contending that the system wouldn't work, had voted to strike all funds for deployment of Sentinel.

Had she taken a stand on Cooper-Hart?

No.

Had anyone asked her to take a stand?

No; her position was understood. (Later Mrs. Smith was to say she was surprised that no one from the opposition had been in touch with her.)



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By nightfall, there was a gnawing fear among anti-ABM partisans that their chances for any kind of victory—either the moral victory of a tie vote or the actual victory that Senator Anderson's vote would bring—were evaporating.

Four of the leading anti-ABM strategists met privately to try to determine what Mrs. Smith would do. There appeared to be a strong possibility that she would vote for her amendment—which under the rules would be taken up before Cooper-Hart—and then, out of some twist of feminine logic, vote against Cooper-Hart because she was opposed to research and development, even if this meant approval of deployment.

But they broke up in disagreement over her motives. Two of the strategists said her intentions were good, if misguided. The others speculated that the Administration had been unhappy with her anti-ABM vote in committee and that Mrs. Smith wanted to vote *against* the ABM and *for* the Administration.

A seat on the Maritime Commission may also have been involved. The term of James V. Day, a Maine man supported by Senator Smith, had expired, and the West Coast, which was unrepresented, was demanding the spot.

## The Vote

Finally, on August 6th, the Senate prepared to vote. At 11 o'clock, the session opened with a prayer by the Rev. Dr. Edward L. R. Elson, the chaplain, "to deploy the strength of our true character, so that as a people we may send forth missiles of friendship and goodwill to all mankind."

Over in the New Senate Office Building, Senator Anderson's telephone rang with a call from President Nixon. Former Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey, an ABM foe, had called earlier. So had at least six Senators.

The day before, Averell Harriman, an old friend from Truman days, had dropped by in an attempt to persuade him to oppose Safeguard. So had another old friend, Walter Reuther, president of the United Auto Workers. Senators Cooper and Hart had spent an hour with him.

This visit was to be critical. The main point under discussion was a proposal drafted by Anderson but never introduced. It would have approved funds for research and development but blocked deployment until a special blue-ribbon commission had conducted a six-month inquiry into the feasibility of the ABM. It was to include all former Secretaries of Defense as well as others to be designated by the President.

Senator Anderson's aim was to produce a substantial majority on the ABM—somewhere in the 60's or 70's—rather than the bare majority anticipated. Senators Cooper and Hart said they saw merit in the proposal—but in the words of Senator Hart, "we were not sure what Senator Anderson was going to do when we left his office."

On the other side, Senator Jackson exerted the most influence on the old man. Their relationship was also close; it extended back to the days when Jackson had come to the Capitol as an Anderson protégé. In 1961, moreover, Jackson had married Miss Helen Hardin, a secretary in Anderson's office. And when Jackson had taken over the Interior Committee from Anderson, he had kept Anderson appointees on the payroll.

The morning of the vote, Senator Anderson drafted a brief statement saying that the ABM should be deployed "but that does not mean deployment in the next day, week, or month...from my point of view, there must be some program controlled by our military which could check carefully what other nations were doing and keep us fully safeguarded."



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What had he received in exchange? Long-time observers of Anderson's activities speculated that he had won an IOU from the Administration that would fall due when he wanted some specific program for his constituency.

On the Senate floor, ABM opponents, unaware that their battle had been lost, struggled to keep Senator Smith's vote for Cooper-Hart. One observer, listening to the flattery directed at her, commented: "Not since Cleopatra have so many Senators listened to one woman's proposition with such interest."

A newsman ran into Senator Gore under the steps of the Capitol where he was awaiting a luncheon guest. Did anyone have any plans to deal with Mrs. Smith, he was asked. N-o-o, the Senator drawled, but his eyes flashed.

Mrs. Smith distributed a letter to her colleagues, saying (a) that she had "no confidence in Safeguard" and (b) that Cooper-Hart, by supporting research and development on the project, "merely postpones the time of decision."

By now it was late afternoon. The Senate was readying itself to vote on her amendment. Almost as if it were on the spur of the moment, Senator Gore rose with a small piece of paper in his hand and turned toward the only woman in the Senate.

Would she accept an amendment to her amendment, clearly spelling out that funds for radar and other components for ABM systems *other than Safeguard* would not be barred? Mrs. Smith looked thoughtfully across the chamber at Senator Gore for a few moments, then agreed.

Pandemonium. Now it was the Administration team's turn to show some distress, for they realized that the Gore strategem would save her vote for a proposal similar to Cooper-Hart. Barry Goldwater sprang to his feet to protest; he tried to block the addition of new language to the existing Smith amendment. Russell and Stennis huddled on the floor; Jackson's face looked gray.

Then came a breathing space. Almost as if by design, Senator John Sparkman (D-Ala.), an ABM supporter, moved to suspend the debate so that he could introduce to his colleagues Horace Maybray King, speaker of the British House of Commons, who was a guest on the Senate floor.

Taking advantage of the line of Senators forming in the back of the chamber to greet King, Senators Smith, Hart, Cooper, Symington, and Javits moved off the floor to a small room behind the rostrum to draft a new amendment.

Senator Gore came out to talk with the press. Seeing him in the lobby, Mary McGrory, of the Washington *Evening Star*, asked: "Are they working something out in there?"

"Why, yes," Gore replied.

"Then get back in there, man!" she shouted. Meekly, the Senator rejoined the small group.

When the session resumed, the Senators voted down the original Smith motion, 89 to 11, and the new Smith-Gore proposal was called up. It stated that no funds could be used for any work on Safeguard but that research and development would be permitted on other advanced ABM systems.

The Administration forces, trying to reorganize, endeavored to raise doubts in the minds of some Cooper-Hart supporters about the meaning and extent of the new amendment.

Taking over for the pro-ABM forces, Senator Russell contended that the new language "will kill all the research and development of the so-called Safeguard system after Senators have stood here on the floor day after day and stated they were in favor of research and development...that strangles it in its crib."

The Georgian's argument had an effect on two Cooper-Hart supporters, Senators Joseph Montoya (D-N.M.) and Cannon. Senators Hart and Symington moved in with quick explanations, holding them in line.

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There are reports that at this point Senator Anderson privately told Mrs. Smith he would support the Smith-Gore amendment but that the word leaked out and Senator Jackson had a quick conversation with the New Mexican in the cloakroom. As they returned to the floor, they shook hands and smiled.

"This is a tragedy!" thundered Senator Stennis. "Some who say they're for research, they're going to have red faces when they see what they've done. Tragedy! It compounds tragedy!"

Senator Russell, who sits beside Senator Magnuson, tried to engage him in conversation. In a stage whisper, Magnuson turned to Senator Mansfield and asked: "How are you going to vote, Mike?"

"I'm voting for it."

"Well, I guess I am, too."

"This system is not aimed at people," declared an irate Senator Tower. "It will not harm the hair on one Russian's head—even if it were fired off."

Senator John O. Pastore (D-R.I.), an ABM supporter known as the Senate's "screaming eagle," unburdened himself of a speech that seemed to be aimed at only one man—Senator Anderson, who sits beside him.

Finally, the clerk began to call the roll. There was no stretching out of names so that members could get to the floor. There was no need for it this time: all 99 men and one woman were in their places.

"Mr. Aiken!"

"Aye!"

"Mr. Allen!"

"No!"

"Mr. Allott!"

"No!"

"Mr. Anderson!"

A pause. And then, "no!"

The drama had ended. The vote, with the Vice President joining in, was 51 to 50 against the quickly fashioned compromise.

The next time around, on Cooper-Hart, Mrs. Smith switched, amid a gasp from the gallery that sounded like air being sucked out of the chamber. Senator Tower had gotten his 51-to-49 vote.

The next day, Senator Hart sat in a brown leather chair in the President's Room off the Senate chamber and discussed the implications of the vote.

"It was one of the Senate's finest hours," he said. "We made the system work."

On the floor, the same coalition that had come within a vote of defeating Safeguard was winning a single-vote victory on an amendment introduced by several younger members to set up an auditing system for major military contracts.

Amendments to curtail testing and transport of chemical and biological warfare agents were to be approved and plans laid for a massive re-evaluation of Pentagon programs. The day in which a Defense Department request for a weapons system meant automatic approval had clearly passed.

Last year, Senator Hart noted, he had failed in an attempt to reduce the Pentagon's research budget to the level of the previous year. This year, the Armed Services Committee itself had cut it by more than $1 billion.

Last year, the Senate had spent only three days on the military procurement bill. This year, it had spent six weeks and the end was not in sight.

"If that's not progress," he said, "I don't know what is." ■



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**Urban Dynamics** by Jay W. Forrester, foreword by John F. Collins

What makes cities degenerate? What can be done to revitalize stagnant urban areas? Are present urban management programs effective, or do they deepen the difficulties in our cities? This study offers some surprising answers to these critical questions and will undoubtedly spark spirited, but fruitful, debate. Professor Forrester develops in detail a dynamic model, or theory, of the processes that affect the life and decay of cities. Such models, permitting dynamic experiments on digital computers, are more relevant today than the familiar scale models of the city planner. They are an extremely useful tool for perception of present trends as well as prediction of future likelihoods.

The present tax policies and legal structure within the cities, in the view of the author, are largely responsible for the urban decay so visible throughout America. Past efforts to prevent or eradicate this blight have produced little success. Policies for reviving urban areas have failed because complex systems, unlike simple ones, defy solutions suggested by human reason and intuition. Most systems that people ordinarily are required to deal with are simple. For example, in the "traffic system," the driver quickly learns when and how to apply the brake. Simple systems tend to be linear and to involve only one feedback loop. Complex systems, of which the city is one, are nonlinear and involve multiple feedback loops. In simple systems cause and effect are closely related in time and space, whereas in complex systems they may be so far apart as to obscure their connection. Unresponsive as they are to commonsense approaches, complex systems are best examined through simulation on computers that can process the detailed interactions between parts of the system.

Intuitive measures proposed for short-term urban improvement, Professor Forrester points out, often intensify the very problems they are intended to alleviate and thus are detrimental in the long run. One of the striking conclusions he reaches is that underemployed-training programs and low-cost-housing programs, although they seem promising, may actually hasten degeneration, while demolishing slum housing and replacing it with industry to create jobs — a policy that is widely frowned upon as inhumane — tend to set in motion a number of desirable long-term trends.

Two types of simulation models are developed in the book. One, a growth model, generates the life cycle of an urban area from its founding through growth to its arrival at a state of stagnation and decay after a period of 250 years. The other begins with the resulting depressed conditions and is used to examine how various policies would alter the condition of the urban area over the next 50 years. The variables include different levels of employment, housing, and industry.

Jay W. Forrester, Professor of Management at M.I.T., is the author of *Industrial Dynamics,* in which he developed analytical methods that have proved applicable to a much more general class of complex systems than the title suggests. The present volume is a specific application of these methods to problems vitally in need of solution.

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